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T: PRIVATE SECTOR

#### “Private sector” means all non-governmental persons or entities, including non-profits

Senate Report 95, (Senate Report, 1995, 104-1, “UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM ACT OF 1995,” <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/senate-report/1>)

"Private sector" is defined to cover all persons or entities in the United States except for State, local or tribal governments. It includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions.

#### TVA: any universally applied standard, like CWS (Consumer Welfare Standard)

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (Noah J. Phillips, 11-1-2018, “Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### The aff only applies to conduct in a specific segment of the private sector

#### Vote neg:

#### 1 ⁠— limits and ground ⁠— the number of potential subsets is infinite ⁠— any industry, production, single company, individuals could be included, which undermines clash; only big affs have link uniqueness

#### 2 ⁠— precision ⁠— has the intent to define, exclude, AND is in legislative context

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#### The aff is based on neoliberal exploitation, which makes monopolies and violence inevitable ⁠— only the alt solves

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One of these is the inexorable tendency of competition to lead to monopoly under capitalism. Competition means winners and losers. By definition, not everyone can win when competing. Competition means rivalry for supremacy. Thousands compete in the Olympics, for example, but only a select few (“winners”) go home with a gold medal.[1] It is no accident that the economy, media, and politics are heavily monopolized by a handful of billionaires while billions of people who actually produce the wealth in society and run society remain marginalized and disempowered. This brutal reality cannot be reversed or overcome with the utterance of a few platitudes, the passage of some policies, or the creation of some agencies that claim to be able to fix the outdated economic system, especially when all of the above come from billionaires themselves. On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden issued an Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/). The order is about 7,000 words long and full of anticonscious statements. Disinformation pervades the entire order. The opening paragraph begins with the following disinformation: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to promote the interests of American workers, businesses, and consumers, it is hereby ordered…. Here, “American workers, businesses, and consumers” are casually misequated and no mention is made of citizens or humans. The implication is that consumerism is normal, healthy, and desirable, and that workers and big business somehow have the same aims, world outlook, and interests. This conceals the fact that owners of capital and workers have antagonistic irreconcilable interests and that people exist as humans and citizens, not just utilitarian consumers and shoppers in a taken-for-granted system based on chaos, anarchy, and violence.

Disinformation is further escalated in the next paragraph:

A fair, open, and competitive marketplace has long been a cornerstone of the American economy, while excessive market concentration threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers. “Market concentration” has been the norm for generations. Monopolies, cartels, and oligopolies have been around since the late 1800s. Mergers and acquisitions have been taking place non-stop for decades. The so-called “free market” largely disappeared long ago. Objectively, there can be no fairness in a system rooted in wage-slavery and empire-building. Wage-slavery is the precondition for the tendency of the rich to get richer and the poor poorer. It is not a recipe for prosperity and security for all. This is also why inequality, tyranny, violence, and surveillance have been growing over the years. Moreover, what “threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers” is the ongoing political and economic exclusion of people from control over the economy and their lives by the financial oligarchy. There can be no liberty, accountability, and welfare when most people are deprived of real decision-making power and major owners of capital make all the decisions. Problems would not constantly worsen if people had control over their lives. The “best allocation of resources” cannot be made when the economy is carved up, fractured, and controlled by competing owners of capital. Although recurring economic crises for well over a century have repeatedly discredited “free market” ideology, the 7,000-word executive order is saturated with the language of “choice,” “competition,” and “consumers.” This is the same worn-out language used by privatizers of all hues at home and abroad. Further, while the executive order gives many examples of “economic consolidation” in numerous sectors, the government is not interested in creating a self-reliant vibrant diverse economy that meets the needs of all. It is not committed to reversing “the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony.” Numerous antitrust laws have not stopped either. Big mergers and acquisitions have been going on for years. Rather, the executive order is an attempt to restructure economic and political arrangements among different factions of the wealthy elite; it reflects a new stage or form of inter-capitalist rivalry for even greater domination of the economy by fewer owners of capital. In other words, moving forward, the economy will remain monopolized by a few monopolies. Wealth is only going to become more concentrated in fewer hands in the years ahead. Mountains of data from hundreds of sources document growing wealth and income inequality every year. The bulk of the executive order is filled with endless directives, strategies, rules, and suggestions for how to curb “unfair practices” and promote “fairness” and “competition.” But these all ring hollow given concrete realities and past experience. Today, governments at all levels have been taken over by global private monopoly interests and have become instruments of decisions made on a supranational basis. There is a fine-tuned revolving door between officials from government and the private sector; they have become synonymous for all essential purposes. The same people who run major corporations also serve in high-level government positions where they advance the narrow interests of the private sector and then they leave government and return to their high-level corporate positions. There is a reason why the majority of members of Congress are millionaires. The Executive Branch in the United States, especially the President’s Office, is a major tool for the expression of the will of the most powerful monopolies. This is why billions of dollars are spent every few years to select the President of the country. A modern economy must be controlled and directed by workers themselves. Only such an economy can provide for the needs of all and avoid endless economic distortions. Uneven economic development, “unfair” arrangements, “market concentration,” monopolies, oligopolies, and recurring crises cannot be avoided so long as those who actually produce the social product have no control over the social product. Workers have first claim to the wealth they produce and have the right to decide how, where, and when that wealth is used. Major owners of capital are historically superfluous and a big block to progress. They are not needed for a healthy vibrant self-reliant economy that meets the needs of all.

#### Competition necessitates racism and antiblackness; all capitalism is racial capitalism ⁠— the system of competition the aff perpetuates cannot sustain itself without theft of indigenous land, super-exploitation of black labor, imperial extraction, and racist devaluation of ‘disposable populations’

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\*2 point font and paragraph merging for readability

\*Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, other footnotes excluded for readability

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

[Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40

Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41 Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44 Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48 The entrapment of Black women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

#### Reject the aff and critically interrogate neoliberal discourse ⁠— resisting capitalist pedagogy in educational spaces is a prerequisite towards anti-capitalist political projects; COVID-19 provides a unique transition opportunity

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As educators, it is crucial for us to examine how we talk, teach, and write about inequality as an object of critique in an age of precarity, uncertainty and the current pandemic crisis. This is especially true at a time when a growing number of authoritarian regimes around the globe substitute replace thoughtful dialogue and critical engagement with the suppression of dissent and a culture of forgetting r. How do we situate our analysis of education as part of a broader discourse and mode of analysis that interrogates the promises, ideals, and claims of a substantive democracy? How do we fight against iniquitous relations of power and wealth that empty power of its emancipatory possibilities, and as Hannah Arendt has argued, “makes most people superfluous as human beings”? How might we understand how neoliberal ideology, with its appropriation of market-based values, regressive notions of freedom and agency, uses language to infiltrate daily life? How does a pandemic pedagogy in the service of neoliberalism produce identities defined by market values, and normalize a notion of responsibility and individuality that convinces people that whatever problem they face they have no one to blame but themselves? Repeated endlessly on right-wing media platforms, the underlying conditions that disproportionately produce chronic illness among poor people of color disappear among a public distracted, if not persuaded, by a pandemic pedagogy that celebrates unchecked self-interest, disdains social responsibility, and turns away from the reality of a society with deep-seated institutional rot and unravelling of social connections and the social contract. Pandemic pedagogy thrives on inequality and becomes a militarized and heartless normalizing tool to convince the broader public that the lives of the elderly, sick, and vulnerable should be valued according to how much they contribute to the economy. And if they are willing to die in order not to be a drain on the economy, all well and good. Nothing escapes the cruel logic of neoliberalism with its arrogance and hubris on full display as it bathes in the glow of right-wing populism, ultra-nationalism, and neofascism. Its accoutrements of dictatorship are everywhere and can be seen in the swagger of militia that storm state capitals, in police who punch and pepper spray protesters and push elderly men to the ground, and in military forces on the streets without badges reinforcing a climate of fear, repression, and unaccountability. There is more at work here than a lack of humanity on the part of the Trump administration. As the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole observes, there is also the deepening grip of a culture of cruelty and dehumanization. He writes: “As a society the American people are being habituated into accepting cruelty on a wide scale. Americans are being taught by Trump and his administration not to see other people as human beings whose lives are as important as their own. Once that line has been crossed – and it is not just Trump and the people around him, but many of Trump’s supporters as well – then we know where that all leads, what the ultimate destination is. There is no mystery about it. We know what happens when a government and its leaders dehumanize large numbers of people.”

Depoliticization and the Authoritarian Turn

Neoliberalism is not only an economic system, it is also an ideological apparatus that relentlessly attempts to structure consciousness, values, desires, and modes of identification in ways that align individuals with its governing structures. Central to this pedagogical project is the attempt to prevent individuals from translating private issues and troubles into broader systemic considerations. By doing this, it becomes difficult for individuals to grasp the historical, social, economic, and political forces at work in shaping a social order as a human activity deeply immersed in specific relations of power. Neoliberalism’s attempt to erase or rewrite historical and social forces makes it difficult for individuals to imagine alternative notions of society, with themselves as collective actors, or view their problems as more than the limitations of faulty character, moral failure, or a problem of personal responsibility. Reducing individuals to isolated, discrete, hermetically-sealed human beings whose lives are shaped only by notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is a pedagogical strategy that utterly depoliticizes people, leading them to believe that however a society is shaped, it is part of a natural order. President Trump echoed this “no alternative” narrative when asked about celebrities and rich people having special access to being tested for the coronavirus while few others had access. He replied, “Perhaps that’s been the story of life.” This individualization of the social with its mounting privatization, gated communities, and social atomization undermines collective action, any viable notion of solidarity, and weakens the notion of global connectivity. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han has rightly argued that contemporary neoliberal society is shaped by a dysfunctional notion of solitude and hermitically-sealed notions of agency, all of which undermine the values and social connections vital to a democracy. He writes: “Those subject to the neoliberal economy do not constitute a we that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is making the space for collective action shrink… The general collapse of the collective and the communal has engulfed it. Solidarity is vanishing. Privatization now reaches into the depths of the soul itself. The erosion of the communal is making all collective efforts more and more unlikely.” This panoptical nature of hyper-individualism is more aligned with shared fears than shared responsibilities. Under such circumstances, trust and the notion that all life is related become difficult to grasp as the myopic language of private self-interest inures individuals to wider social problems such as extreme inequality. There is no understanding in this discourse of the damage fanatical entrepreneurialism does to our embodied collectivity. Nor is there any value attributed to the important responsibilities, social values, and notion of the common good that exceeds who we are as individuals, or how we have been shaped by diverse social forces in particular ways. It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable. Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects. The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.” Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited. Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics.

Overcoming Pandemic Pedagogy

The kind of societies that will emerge after the pandemic is up for grabs. In some cases, the crisis will give way to authoritarian regimes such as Chile, Hungary and Turkey, all of which have used the urgency of COVID-19 as an excuse to impose more state control and surveillance, squelch dissent, eliminate civil liberties and concentrate power in the hands of an authoritarian political class. As is well documented, history in a time of crisis also has the potential to change dominant ideologies, rethink the meaning of governance, and enlarge the sphere of justice and equality through a vision that fights for a more generous and inclusive politics. It is crucial to rethink the project of politics in order to imagine forms of resistance that are collective, inclusive and global, capable of producing new democratic arrangements for social life, more radical values and a “global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of market mechanisms.” This is a politics that must move beyond siloed identities and fractured political factions in order to build transnational solidarities in the service of an alternative radically democratic society. Making the pedagogical more political means challenging those forms of pandemic pedagogy that turn politics into theater, a favorite tactic of Trump. In this case, the performance works to suspend disbelief, hold power accountable and unravel one’s sense of critical agency. Pandemic pedagogy does more than undermine critical thinking and informed judgments, it dissolves the line between the truth and lies, fantasy and reality, and in doing so, destroys the foundation for understanding, engaging and promoting that social and economic justice. The endgame under the rubric of a pandemic pedagogy is not simply the destruction of the truth, but the elimination of democracy itself. Central to developing an alternative democratic vision is development of a language that refuses to look away and be commodified. Such a language should be able to break through the continuity and consensus of common sense and appeals to the natural order of things. At stake here is the need to reclaim both critical and redemptive elements of a radical democracy in order to address the full spectrum of violence that structures institutions and everyday life in the United States. This is a language connected to the acquisition of civic literacy, and it demands a different regime of desires and identifications to enable us to move from “shock and stunned silence toward a coherent visceral speech, one as strong as the force that is charging at us.” Of course, there is more at stake here than a struggle over meaning; there is also the struggle over power, over the need to create a formative culture that will produce informed critical agents who will fight for and contribute to a broad social movement that will translate meaning into a fierce struggle for economic, political and social justice. Agency in this sense must be connected to a notion of possibility and education in the service of radical change. Reimagining the future only becomes meaningful when it is rooted in a fierce struggle against the horrors and totalitarian practices of a pandemic pedagogy that falsely claims that it exists outside of history. Václav Havel, the late Czech political dissident-turned-politician, once argued that politics follows culture, by which he meant that changing consciousness is the first step toward building mass movements of resistance. What is crucial here in the age of multiple crises is a thorough grasp of the notion that critical and engaged forms of agency are a product of emancipatory education. Moreover, at the heart of any viable notion of politics is the recognition that politics begins with attempts to change the way people think, act and feel with respect to both how they view themselves and their relations to others. There is more to agency than the neoliberal emphasis on the “empire of the self,” with its unchecked belief in the virtues of a form of self-interest that despises the bonds of sociality, solidarity and community. The U.S. is in the midst of a political and pedagogical crisis. This is a crisis defined not only by a brutalizing racism and massive inequality, but also a constitutional crisis produced by a growing authoritarianism that has been in the making for some time. The recent attacks by the police on journalists, peaceful protesters and even elderly people marching for racial justice echoes the violence of the Brownshirts in the 1930s. Let’s stop the futile debate about whether or not the U.S. is in the midst of a fascist state and shift the register to the more serious question of how to resist it and restore a semblance of real democracy. Under such circumstances, education should be viewed as central to politics, and it plays a crucial role in producing informed judgments, actions, morality and social responsibility at the forefront not only of agency, but politics itself. In this scenario, truth and politics mutually inform each other to erupt in a pedagogical awakening at the moment when the rules are broken. Taking risks becomes a necessity, self-reflection narrates its capacity for critically engaged agency and thinking the impossible is not an option, but a necessity. Without an informed and educated citizenry, democracy can lead to tyranny, even fascism. Trump represents the malignant presence of a fascism that never dies and is ready to remerge at different times in different context in sometimes not-so-recognizable forms. The COVID-19 crisis and the pandemic of inequality and racism have revealed elements of a fascist politics that are more than abstractions. The struggle against a fascist politics is now visible in the rebellions taking place across the United States. While there are no political guarantees for a victory, there is a new sense that the future can be changed in the image of a just and sustainable society. There is a new energy for reform taking place in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. Massive protests for racial, economic and social justice are emerging all over the globe. As I have argued in The Terror of the Unforeseen, at stake here is the need for these protests to transition from a pedagogical moment and collective outburst of moral anger to a progressive international movement that is well organized and unified. Such a movement must build solidarity among different groups, imagine new forms of social life, make the impossible possible, and produce a revolutionary project in defense of equality, social justice and popular sovereignty. The racial, class, ecological and public health crisis facing the globe can only be understood as part of a comprehensive crisis of the totality. Immediate solutions such as defunding the police and improving community services are important, but they do not deal with the larger issue of eliminating a neoliberal system structured in massive racial and economic inequalities. David Harvey is right in arguing that the “immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious construction of a new political framework for approaching the question of inequality, through a deep and profound critique of our economic and social system.” This is a crisis in which different threads of oppression must be understood as part of the general crisis of capitalism. The various protests now evolving internationally at the popular level offer the promise of new global anti-fascist and anti-capitalist movements. In the current moment, democracy may be under a severe threat and appear frighteningly vulnerable, but with young people and others rising up across the globe — inspired, energized and marching in the streets — the future of a radical democracy is waiting to breathe again.

## Pandemics

### 1NC---!D---Disease

#### No extinction from disease.

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1.1.3 Engineered pandemics

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

## Competition

### 1NC ⁠— Turn

#### Concede they solve hegemonic and economic collapse

#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### Pursing heg locks in overstretch and a Russia-China axis.

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There is little sign of active “splitting” currently, however. (A notable exception is recent collaboration with Beijing over North Korea’s nuclear program, even if it is marred by tension and distrust.) Rather, the United States is encouraging the perception of a common enemy. By militarily positioning itself within striking distance of Russia and China through a semi-encircling presence in eastern Europe and north-east Asia, expanding alliances, entertaining further expansion, ramping up freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, reviving the pursuit of an antiballistic missile shield, establishing a reputation as a sponsor of “color revolutions” and as an overthrower of regimes, Washington helps draw Beijing and Moscow closer together into a balancing coalition. A nascent Russia-China alliance is suggested by Russia’s own interagency inquiry into the possibility, the frequency of Putin-Xi contact, deliberate tightening of economic interaction, and overt displays and declarations of close military ties through joint exercises and arms sales.24

It does not have to be this way. The United States has a geopolitical advantage—its distant location. Most powers, most of the time, are more concerned by the potential threat of other nearby land powers than distant sea powers.25Based in the Western hemisphere, the United States has less of a compelling security interest in adversaries ’backyards, allowing Washington the choice of adopting a more distant pose. Russia and China, by contrast, are neighbors so cannot withdraw, both are primarily continental land-based military powers, and historically such proximity can exacerbate rivalries and mutual fears. Sino-Russian antagonism remains a built-in possibility. Only under the right conditions, though, can the rivalries again grow. This is not a plea for a trilateral realignment whereby one state agrees to be the United States’ “geopolitical hammer” and teams up with Washington to contain the other. Rather, it is to suggest that more American restraint in one theater could make space for Russia-China frictions to take effect in another.

This geopolitical principle will prove controversial. The bipartisan consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume that only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice. Policymakers assume that the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power, or to apply enough power efficiently enough. They then call for the allocation of more resources and their smarter use in order to sustain U.S. dominance. The congressionally-mandated2018National Defense Strategy Commission report, appointed to make recommendations, is a case in point. It takes dominance as the obvious U.S. national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, U.S. military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars has eroded, due tor-educed defense expenditure, and advises that it spend more while cutting entitlements.26On this logic, a defense budget that is already10 times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s is not enough, for U.S. grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to achieve unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is not considered.

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expend-able for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### Russia-China coordination triggers global war.

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While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit.

Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States.

China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

#### Retrenchment key to a concert strategy---that unlocks global governance.

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I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse.

In Search of a Global Public

Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy.

If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.

#### Global governance checks emerging tech, pandemics, and war---extinction.

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Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

### Degrowth — 1NC

#### Growth is unsustainable — pursuit causes extinction and turns war.

Trainer 20, PhD from University of Sydney. Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Ted, The Simpler Way: Collected Writings of Ted Trainer, *The Simplicity Institute*, pp. 3-6)

1. Unsustainability

The way of life we have in rich countries is grossly unsustainable. There is no possibility of all people on Earth ever rising to rich world per capita levels of consumption of energy, minerals, timber, water, food, phosphorous etc. These rates of consumption are generating numer-ous alarming global problems, now threatening our survival and the survival of other species. Most people have no idea of the magnitude of the overshoot – of how far we are beyond sustainable levels of re-source use and environmental impact. If all the estimated 9.8 billion people living on earth in 2050 were to consume resources at the pres-ent per capita rate in rich countries, world annual resource production rates would have to be about eight times as great as they are now.

For instance, the ‘Ecological Footprint’ analysis indicates that the amount of productive land required to provide one person in Australia with food, water, energy and settlement area is about 6.6 ha (Global Footprint Network, 2019). If 9.8 billion people were to live as Australians do, approximately 65 billion ha of productive land would be required. However, the total amount of productive land available is only 12 billion ha. If we assume one third of this should be set aside for nature (see, e.g., Baillie Yang, 2018) the amount available for humans might be about 8 billion ha. In other words, our rich world per capita footprint is about eight times as big as it would ever be possible for all of the world’s people to sustainably share.

Figures for some other items indicate much worse ratios. For instance, the top 10 nations consuming iron ore and bauxite (from which we ob-tain aluminium and steel) have per capita use rates that are respectively around 65 and 90 times the rates for all the other nations (Wiedmann et al., 2015). Mineral ore grades are falling. All people could not rise to present rich world levels of mineral use. The same case can be made with respect to just about all other resources and ecosystem services, such as agricultural land, forests, fisheries, water and biomass.

These simple figures clearly demonstrate the impossibility of all people ever having the material ‘living standards’ we have taken for granted in rich countries like Australia. We are not just a little beyond sustainable levels of resource demand and ecological impact – we are far beyond sustainable levels. Rich world practices, systems and ‘living standards’ are grossly unsustainable, and can never be extended to all the world’s people. Again, few people seem to grasp the magnitude of the over-shoot. We must face up to dramatic reductions in our present per capita levels of production and consumption.

1.1. Now add the absurd commitment to economic growth

The main worry is not the present level of resource use and ecological impact discussed above, it is the level we will rise to given the obsession with constantly increasing the amount of production and consumption. The supreme goal in all countries is to raise incomes, ‘living standards’ and GDP as much as possible, constantly and without any idea of a limit. That is, the most important goal is economic growth.

Consider the implications. If we assume a) a 3% p.a. economic growth, b) a population of 9.8 billion, c) all the world’s people rising to the living standards we in the rich world would have in 2050 given 3% p.a. growth – in that scenario, the total volume of world economic output would be 20 times as great as it is now and doubling every 23 years thereafter.

So even though the present levels of production and consumption are grossly unsustainable, the determination to have continual increase in income and economic output will multiply these towards absurd and impossible levels in coming decades.

Why analyse in terms of 9.8 billion rising to rich world levels? Because a) it is not morally acceptable to assume that they remain much poorer than we are, and b) that’s what everyone aspires to, so we had better think about whether it is viable.

1.2 But what about technical advance?

When confronted by global sustainability problems most people just assume that technical advance and ‘green growth’ will solve them, enabling us to go on living with ever-increasing levels of affluence. They do not realise that the magnitude of the problems rules this out.

The core ‘tech-fix’ faith is that resource demand and environmental impacts can be ‘decoupled’ from economic growth, i.e., that produc-tion and consumption can go on increasing while resource demand is sufficiently reduced. This is extremely implausible (see Part Three of this anthology for more detail). How likely is it that the world’s amount of production could be multiplied by 20 while resource use and environmental impacts are reduced by, say, 50% – i.e., a factor 40 reduction? None of the thirty or more reports over the last 20 years show any global reduction at all; they all show that as GDP rises so do the impacts. The recent review essay by Hickel and Kallis (2019) pro-vides a powerful critique of ‘green growth’ (see also Ward et al., 2016).

1.3 Global problems should be seen in terms of ‘limits to growth’

The ‘limits to growth’ perspective (Meadows et al., 1972) is essential if we are to understand the most serious global problems facing us:

The environmental problem is basically due to the fact that far too much producing and consuming is going on, taking too many resources rom nature and dumping too many wastes back into nature. We are eliminating species mainly because we are taking or ruining so much habitat. The environmental problems cannot be solved in an economy that is geared to providing ever-rising production, con-sumption, ‘living standards’ and GDP (see the next essay, ‘Why this economy must be scrapped’, for more detail).

Third World poverty and underdevelopment are inevitable if a few living in rich countries insist on taking far more of the world’s re-sources than all could have. The Third World can never develop to rich world levels of consumption, because there are far too few re-sources for that. (For more detail on this issue, see the essay ‘Third World development’ in Part Two.)

Conflict and war are inevitable if all aspire to rich world rates of consumption, and if rich countries insist on limitless growth on a planet with limited resources. Rich countries now have to support repressive regimes willing to establish policies that enable our cor-porations to ship out cheap resources, use Third World land for export crops, exploit cheap labour etc. This means we must be ready to get rid of regimes and to invade and run countries that threaten to follow policies contrary to our First World interests. Our rich world living standards could not be as high as they are if a great deal of repression and violence was not taking place, and rich countries contribute significantly to this. If we are determined to remain affluent, we should remain heavily armed! (This issue is developed in the essay in part Two called ‘If you want affluence, prepare for war’.)

Social cohesion is deteriorating and quality of life is being damaged. This is so even in the richest nations, because the supreme goals are raising business turnover, incomes and the GDP, not meet-ing needs, building community and improving the quality of life. (Some details of this decline in quality of life and the benefits of an alternative way to live are discussed in Part Four.)

#### Warming causes extinction---that’s their arg

#### A second recession during COVID guarantees a successful transition — it both forces degrowth policies and makes them more popular.

Kallis et al. 20, ICREA Professor at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, With: Susan Paulson, Giacomo D’Alisa, Federico Demaria (Giorgios, “The case for degrowth in a time of pandemic,” *openDemocracy*, 5/14/2020, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/case-degrowth-time-pandemic/>)

The pandemic has lain bare the fragility of existing economic systems. Wealthy nations have more than enough resources to cover public health and basic needs during a crisis, and could weather declines in non-essential parts of the economy by reallocating work and resources to essential ones. Yet the way current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, any decline in market activity threatens systemic collapse, provoking generalized unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. To be more resilient to crises – pandemic, climatic, financial, or political – we need to build systems capable of scaling back production in ways that do not cause loss of livelihood or life. We make the case for degrowth. Conservative outlets such as [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2020/04/29/still-against-degrowth/), the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/0b171892-8afd-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a), or the [Spectator](https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-coronavirus-crisis-reveals-the-misery-of-degrowth-), have been pronouncing that the coronavirus crisis reveals “the misery of degrowth”. But what is happening during the pandemic [is not degrowth](https://twitter.com/DegrowthMemes/status/1255783275987177473). Degrowth is a project of living meaningfully, enjoying simple pleasures, commoning, sharing and relating more with others, and working less, in more equal societies. The goal of degrowth is to purposefully slow things down in order to minimize harm to humans and earth systems and to reduce exploitation. The current situation is terrible, not because carbon emissions are declining, which is good, but because many lives are lost; it is terrible not because GDPs are going down, to which we are indifferent, but because processes in place to protect livelihoods when growth falters are grossly insufficient and unjust. We would like to see societies become slower by design, not disaster. This pandemic is a growth-induced disaster, harbinger of more to come. Drives for growth have accelerated global flows of material and money, paving the way for lightning-fast circulation of bodies and diseases. The economic policies and social arrangements proposed by degrowth offer ways to make such situations more liveable and just, to emerge stronger and better post-crisis, and to reorient practices and politics towards care and community solidarity. The end of growth will not necessarily involve a smooth transition. It may very well be unplanned, unwilled, and messy, in conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through now. History often evolves with punctuations; periods of seeming paralysis can reach a tipping point, when unexpected events open new possibilities and violently close others. The COVID-19 pandemic is such an event. Suddenly, things take radical new directions, and the unthinkable becomes thinkable, for better or for worse. Severe economic depression led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also to Hitler’s Third Reich. What are the possibilities and dangers now? Amid this pandemic, many scientific, political, and moral authorities are communicating the message that caring for people’s health and wellbeing should come before profit, and that is great. A resurgence of a care ethic that we advocate in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) is evident in the willingness of people to stay home to protect their elders, and in the spirit of duty and sacrifice among care and health workers. Of course, many stay home also because they fear the virus and worry about themselves, or to avoid police fines. And many care workers go to work because they must earn a living. Acting collectively against crises, pandemic, or climate change requires such combinations of sacrifice and solidarity, self and collective interest, government interventions and people’s participation. Deep inequalities are coming into play in new ways. Residents of some countries are suffering different, and sometimes more severe, hardships than those of others, as are those who are deprived of full citizenship in prisons, migrant labor camps, and refugee settlements. Within each country, actors differentiated by gender, racial, socioeconomic, and occupational positions suffer different vulnerabilities in the face of the disease, and of the economic downturns that follow. Data from countries around the world show that [COVID tends to be much more severe and deadly in men](https://www.livescience.com/why-covid-19-more-severe-men.html) than in women. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show a disproportionate burden of illness and death among [racial and ethnic minority groups](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html). Nurses, health aids, and caretakers, positions in which women prevail, are especially vulnerable to infection. As are millions of men working in essential jobs including sanitation, trucking, taxi-driving, and meat packing. These jobs, in very large majority performed by men, were already among the most dangerous occupations before adding exposure to coronavirus. While some have the luxury of sheltering at home, others must choose between unemployment without an adequate safety net and working at jobs that expose them to the coronavirus. Yet, unless whole populations are protected, not even the wealthiest are fully safe from contagion. In this crisis, like others before, [people have mobilized and self-organized](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/31/virus-neighbours-covid-19) where businesses and governments have failed to provide for their needs – from mutual aid groups delivering food and medicines for elders, to groups of doctors, engineers, and hackers collaborating to 3-D print components for oxygen ventilators, to students babysitting the children of doctors and nurses. The proliferation of caring and commoning endeavors, which form the bedrock of the degrowth societies we envision, are all the more commendable given the contagious nature of the virus. After the pandemic is over, and the difficult path of economic reconstruction starts, this resurgent dynamism of commoning and care will be vital. Positive impulses among individuals and grassroots networks are necessary but not sufficient for sustained change. We need governments to secure healthcare for all, protect the environment, and provide economic safety nets. [The degrowth-supporting policies](https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/can-we-prosper-without-growth-10-policy-proposals/) we advocate were necessary before the pandemic, and are more so during and after: a Green New Deal and public investment program, work-sharing, a basic care income, universal public services, and support for community economies. So is the reorganization of public finance through measures including carbon fees, caps on wealth and high incomes, taxes on natural resource use, and pollution. Whereas degrowth debates have traditionally focused on demobilizing resource-intensive and ecologically damaging aspects of current economies, [pandemic responses](https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/03/the-anti-wartime-economy) deal with demobilizing those aspects not immediately essential for sustaining life. We coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of managing political economies without growth during and after the pandemic: how to demobilize parts of the capitalist economy while securing the provisioning of basic goods and services, experimenting with resource-light ways of enjoying ourselves, and finding collective meanings in life. Radical proposals are already being considered and selectively adopted across the political spectrum as they provide concrete solutions amid the pandemic. Companies and governments have reduced working hours and implemented work-sharing; different forms of basic income are being debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers in the quarantine period and after businesses close; an international campaign for [care income](https://globalwomenstrike.net/) has been launched; governments have engaged the productive apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments. There is growing understanding that vast government spending will be required. The world will change after the pandemic, and there will be struggles over which paths to take. People will have to fight to direct change toward more equitable and resilient societies that have gentler impacts on humans and natural environments. Powerful actors will try to reconstitute status quo arrangements, and to shift costs to those with less power. It takes organizing and a confluence of alliances and circumstances to ensure that it won’t be the environment and the workers who pay the bill, but those who profited most from the growth that preceded this disaster. [Degrowth is not forced deprivation](https://vocabulary.degrowth.org/), but an aspiration to secure enough for everyone to live with dignity and without fear; to experience friendship, love, and health; to be able to give and receive care; to enjoy leisure and nature, and to legitimize a life that it is also an experience of interdependence and vulnerability. This goal will not be met by subsidizing fossil fuel companies, airlines, cruise ships, hotels, and tourism mega-businesses. Instead, states need to finance Green New Deals and rebuild their health and care infrastructures, creating jobs in a just transition to economies that are less environmentally damaging. As oil prices fall, fossil fuels should be taxed heavily, raising funds to support green and social investments, and to provide tax breaks and dividends to working people. Rather than using public money to bail out corporations and banks, we urge the establishment of a [basic care income](https://comune-info.net/reddito-di-cura/) that will help people and communities to reconstruct their lives and livelihoods. These fundamental questions related to the strategies for socio-ecological transformation will be at the center of the [international Vienna degrowth conference](https://www.degrowthvienna2020.org/en/landing-page/) taking place as an online event in late May 2020. A good starting point are the principles for the recovery of the economy and the basis of creating a just society contained in the open letter [‘Degrowth: New Roots for the Economy’](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/degrowth-new-roots-economy/). This crisis arguably opens up more dangers than it does possibilities. We worry about the politics of fear that the coronavirus pandemic engenders, the intensification of surveillance and control of peoples’ movements, xenophobia and blame of others, as well as home isolation that curbs commoning and political organizing. Once measures such as curfews, quarantines, rule-by-decree, border controls, or election postponements are taken, they can easily become part of the arsenal of political possibility, opening dystopian horizons. To counter these risks, degrowth motivates and guides us to re-found societies on the commons of mutual aid and care, orienting collective pursuits away from growth and toward wellbeing and equity. These are not just lofty aspirations; in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) we identify everyday practices and concrete policies to start building the world we want today, together with political strategies to support synergy among these efforts in the construction of equitable and low-impact societies. This book is unlike any other on degrowth, in that it is the first to try to address the hard question of ‘how to’ in the current political conjuncture. Before the pandemic, we had to work hard to convince people of the case for degrowth. Our job may be somewhat easier now amid such tangible evidence that the current system is crumbling under its own weight. As we embark on the second major global economic crisis in a dozen years, perhaps some of us will be more willing to question the wisdom of producing and consuming more and more, just to keep the system going. The time is ripe for us to refocus on what really matters: not GDP, but the health and wellbeing of our people and our planet.

#### Economic decline will be peaceful — COVID proves.

Walt 20, Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen, May 13th, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>, Accessed 04-20-2021)

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely.

Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.

If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished.

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### Growth-driven tech innovation proliferates and advances the technology necessary to conduct bioterrorism.

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Whatever the actual potential of these technologies, it is clear that a powerful technological imaginary exists among policy makers, technologists, and economists that contributes to an unshakeable faith in innovation and human ingenuity to solve the decoupling challenge. Degrowth proponents have so far mainly challenged this optimism by emphasizing the limited potential of renewable energy due to its intermittency and high land and raw material demands (e.g. Kallis, 2018). However, this may downplay the (at least theoretical) potential for convergent breakthroughs in nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and AI to vastly improve renewable energy efficiency and storage systems while designing new materials to substitute for depleting minerals (Diamandis and Kotler, 2014). More broadly, while degrowthers have to some extent considered individual FIR technologies (particularly AI and biotechnology) (e.g. Kallis, 2018; Kerschner et al., 2018), they have yet to address their convergent and mutually amplifying character, which leaves them vulnerable to the arguments of techno-optimists. Of course, the revolutionary promise of these technologies may fail to materialize, and, given the magnitude of the decoupling challenge, degrowth advocates are right to be skeptical. However, due to irreducible uncertainty combined with the ‘exponential’ and ‘revolutionary’ potential of the FIR (Schwab, 2017), even more rigorous critical assessments would always be insufficient in the eyes of the techno-optimists. Therefore, an alternative line of response should also be pursued: what if the FIR does succeed in decoupling economic growth from total environmental impact? What unintended consequences then might this give rise to?3 Dual-use technologies and the democratization of violence First, we must consider that all these are ‘dual-use technologies’, or technologies with potential both for economic productivity and violence. As Blum and Wittes (2015, p. 2) explain, these technologies are driving a trend referred to as the ‘democratization of violence’ in which the ‘destructive power once reserved to states is now the potential province of individuals’. Rather than simply a matter of creating new individual weapons, Blum and Wittes (2015, pp. 39, 7-8) emphasize that convergent FIR technologies are generating ‘whole technological fields – a series of breakthroughs in basic science and engineering’ that ‘generate creativity in their users to build and invent new things, new weapons, and new modes of attack’. And to compound the problem, while FIR technologies empower individuals to kill and provoke systemic chaos unlike any other time in history, they also empower states to monitor the minute details of private and public life and potentially constrict individual and collective freedoms, while the unprecedented threats enabled by these same technologies will likely reinforce governmental efforts to intensify securitization as deeply as is technologically feasible. Blum and Wittes summarize the emerging predicament as follows: How should we think about the relationship between liberty and security when we both rely on governments to protect us from radically empowered fellow citizens around the globe and also fear the power those same technologies give to governments? (Blum and Wittes, 2015, p. 13) Blum and Wittes do not consider how the earth system crisis will intersect with these threats, either as a positive or negative feedback. But it should be clear that, in a world of FIR-driven sustainability solutions, they would inevitably intensify, and it is thus necessary to consider what new problems and governmental responses they would engender.4 Without claiming to exhaustively describe the security risks created by the FIR, I will focus on three emerging areas of concern: biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization, and will then discuss how they may collectively generate a spiral of insecurity and securitization. Biotechnology and the emerging terrain of biosecurity To begin with biosecurity, both the promise and peril of biotechnology – particularly the still nascent field of synthetic biology – is its immense creative potential. As a recent report from the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) describes: synthetic biology is expected to (1) expand the range of what could be produced, including making bacteria and viruses more harmful; (2) decrease the amount of time required to engineer such organisms; and (3) expand the range of actors who could undertake such efforts. (NAS, 2018, p. 4) For example, manipulating DNA structures in microorganisms can make certain agents more virulent, improve their resistance to antibiotics and vaccines, make them less detectable by already limited surveillance systems, transform harmless microorganisms into deadly ones, and make pathogens more resilient to diverse atmospheric conditions, thus increasing their lifespan (Charlet, 2018; NAS, 2018). At present these capabilities remain limited and dependent on highly advanced techniques and laboratory equipment, which is why most experts believe there have to date been no mass casualty bioterror attacks (NAS, 2018). However, the NAS notes that improvements in synthesis technology have followed a ‘Moore’s Law–like’ curve for both reductions in costs and increases in the length of constructs that are attainable’, and that ‘these trends are likely to continue’ (NAS, 2018, pp. 18–19). Moreover, automated DNA synthesis techniques remove much of the time-consuming and technically difficult aspects of manipulating DNA, further reducing barriers to access (Wintle et al., 2017). And in the future, experts warn that ‘convergent capabilities’ between synthetic biology, information technology, nanotechnology, and 3D printing may enable ‘sudden’ breakthroughs in bioweaponization (e.g. by improving bio-agent stability and delivery, providing advance[d]s aerosolization capability, and accelerating the ‘Design-and-Build’ cycle) (NAS, 2018, p. 87). The possibilities of bio-weaponization will expand as these techniques diffuse, which are already enabling the formation of a ‘DIYbio’ movement in which amateur scientists, inventors, and others are increasingly ‘capable of doing at home what just a few years ago was only possible in the most advanced university, government or industry laboratories’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1109). The new CRIPSR/Cas9 gene editing technique further expands the range of genomic tinkering available to individuals, which has been widely embraced by the DIYbio community as a powerful tool that ‘makes it easy, cheap, and fast to move genes around – any genes, in any living thing’ (Maxmen, 2015). The capacities of DIY biohackers remain limited in important ways, though the trends described above suggests they will continue to increase as barriers to advanced bio-weaponization fall (NAS, 2018). And while the risks are evident, the democratization of these techniques may also facilitate the diffusion and customization of local solutions to environmental and health challenges while enhancing popular participation in the direction of biotechnological evolution away from transnational corporate dominance (Bennett et al., 2009). We can therefore say that these emerging technologies pose a unique kind of ‘security dilemma’: while their development and diffusion may strengthen local and global capacities to solve environmental challenges, they may also imperil global security by unleashing uniquely powerful and complex violence capabilities. Synthetic biology is only in its early stages, and governments from the UK to China aim to ‘accelerate [its] industrialization and commercialization’ in order ‘to drive economic growth’ and ‘develop solutions to key challenges across the bioeconomy, spanning health, chemicals, advanced materials, energy, food, security and environmental protection’ (Synthetic Biology Leadership Council, 2016, pp. 13, 4). If calls for emergency action to exponentially expand the green economy indeed accelerate these trends (Falk et al., 2018), then by 2030 (and more so by 2040) we will live in a world where genetically engineered biofuels dramatically increase, genetic tinkering with crop varieties is normalized to enhance agricultural resilience, and gene drives are deployed to control old and new disease vectors intensified by climate change (among other potential applications), which would exponentially expand the number of individuals with biotech expertise and access to the needed equipment. Therefore, while we have yet to experience a catastrophic bioterror attack, rapid advances in synthetic biology are nonetheless creating a ‘black swan waiting to happen’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1110), and the risk is that such black swans could become increasingly ‘normal’ if this technology becomes a key engine of economic growth and green technological innovation.

# 2NC

## Competition

### 2NC ⁠— T/ Case

#### Primacy in Asia is unsustainable---pursuing it causes counterbalancing and miscalc.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

It Is Difficult to Stop China’s Continued Rise

Second, neo-primacy’s logic rests on shaky foundations, as the United States’ opportunity to reclaim preeminence is extremely small, and the effort will likely prove both counterproductive and dangerous. Baldly, if the United States was unable to keep China from becoming a near-peer competitor in the first place via classic primacy, it is even less likely that the United States has the wherewithal to put the Chinese genie back in the bottle and now push China from the great power ranks via neo-primacy.

States generally balance when confronted with a direct external threat. This tendency is significant in the US-China context because, under neo-primacy, the United States would effectively declare itself a direct threat to China at a time when US analysts acknowledge China has a growing capacity to oppose American plans and ambitions.53 Though China is not poised to dominate East Asia, it can thus be expected to devote its own considerable resources toward keeping pace with US efforts to arrest China’s rise and/or shift the relative distribution of power in the US favor. The odds of major crises would then increase as Washington and Beijing maneuver for position, in turn raising the odds of escalatory spirals, miscalculation, and war.54

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

#### Turns warming

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At the moment, confrontation with China might seem to offer something for everyone, much as the anti-Soviet crusade initially promised. In the late 1940s, businesses saw an opportunity to expand trade and secure capitalism; organized labor signed on, agreeing to discipline its ranks for a slice of the economic pie. It seemed like a good bargain, at least until growth stalled and the Cold War turned out to mean dying in Vietnam.

The costs were immense then, and they could be steeper now. For one, it is no coincidence that a president who denies climate change is leading the charge against China, the top emitter of greenhouse gases. Arresting climate change requires America and China to cooperate and channel their competition into salvaging the planet rather than seizing its resources. The American people can live with an authoritarian China. They cannot live on an uninhabitable Earth.

Nor should the American people fear a Chinese military attack. Even in East Asia, Chinese forces are not about to displace American ones. The United States has time to assess China’s ambitions and encourage its neighbors to defend themselves. Unremitting hostility may prove self-fulfilling, inducing China to seek to oust the United States military from the region. Although some think containing China offers a rationale for leaving the Middle East, they should think ahead: A new cold war could plunge the United States back into gruesome proxy wars around the world and risk a still deadlier war among the great powers.

#### Turns the terminal to econ---heg drives countries to ally against the US AND drives every conflict, which are the global governance AND Russo-Sino axis scenarios---

### 2NC---!D---Heg

#### Treat their evidence with skepticism---there are strong financial incentives to defend hegemony and demonize alternatives

Parmar 19, professor of International Politics at City, University of London, and Head of the Department of International Politics. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, and past President of the British International Studies Association. (Inderjeet, June 3rd, 2019; “Transnational Elite Knowledge Networks: Managing American Hegemony in Turbulent Times”, pg. 6-8, *Security Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1604986)

American elite knowledge networks center on the strategic and heavily interconnected corporate-philanthropic foundation. The liberal Ford and Rockefeller foundations and conservative variants all fund knowledge networks.28 Unburdened by electors or shareholders, these institutions are governed by trustees drawn from corporations, government, corporate media, and elite universities. Their elitist mindsets and ethno-racial and class identities differentiate these trustees from the majority of Americans. We can track the rise of American global hegemony by exploring the increasing significance of foundations and the institutional architecture that owes its origins to concentrated corporate wealth. At home, this comprised a dense network of think tanks, university foreign affairs organizations, area studies, and social-scientific programs, all of which interlinked with practitioners in politics, media, and government. These elite knowledge networks built long-term relationships that created pathways for the international circulation of ideas, people, and money, and usually connected strongly with American organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). These knowledge networks’ greatest achievement is the elaboration of a liberal-internationalist elite consensus that rejects isolationism and spans the two main political parties, the media, and attentive publics. With the American state’s full cooperation, such knowledge networks helped to establish the post-1945 liberal international order that included Bretton Woods, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.

Official institutions of the liberal international order included the intertwined spines of the private and state-private institutional architecture that had been established during the Cold War to perform the major functions of US hegemonic knowledge networks. These networks grew deep roots in core Western states and civil societies. Symbiotic with NATO, European unity, and the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, such networks provided an international umbrella and developed politically powerful domestic constituencies that were invested in the liberal international order.29

Nevertheless, hegemony studies neglects American ideational-infrastructural power that is operationalized and embedded in influential power-knowledge networks, with linkages that unify private/public domains and international/domestic spheres, and that legitimize domestic vertical power inequality and horizontal inequalities between societies. Those networks are the power technology of the foreign policy establishment.30 Such neglect diminishes our understanding of the forces that perpetuate American hegemony and enable hegemonic elites to block or manage discontent. This article’s neo-Gramscian argument is that, despite crises and challenges that include the disruptive effects of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and subsequent Twitter-disseminated rhetoric, those networks continue to successfully manage, channel, or block threats to American hegemony. Such networks are likely to remain significant during the Trump presidency, and to constrain attempts to radically alter the liberal international order.

American hegemony, because it is imperial in character and rooted in domestic power elites, is contested at home and abroad—more or less openly—depending on the balance of forces. Hegemony sets requirements on the hegemon. These requirements include delivery of certain freedoms, rights, security, and opportunities, which together construct “the American dream,” as well as a stable world order in which prosperity increases and aspirations appear achievable.31

#### 1AC impact author isn’t qualled

Sirish **Paudel 20** (is currently pursuing his master’s degree in International Relations from SIPA, Jilin University, and is a journalist for Modern Diplomacy. “Decline in US Hegemony: Will this Result in Hegemonic War or not?” 9/3/20 https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/03/decline-in-us-hegemony-will-this-result-in-hegemonic-war-or-not/)//conway

#### No Chinese hegemony.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, pg. 88-89)

The China Threat May Be Over-Hyped

First, and at the most basic level, it is not obvious that the China threat is as draconian as neo-primacy allows. To be sure, China is a more capable competitor than the United States has faced in many decades (and perhaps ever). Even compared to the Soviet Union, China enjoys a more dynamic economy, is better integrated into international institutions, has a larger and more homogenous population, and is geographically closer to the arena of major strategic contestation.51

That said, China is in a less advantageous position to do much with the capabilities at its disposal. On one level, Beijing does not enjoy the power vacuums along its periphery enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the heyday of the USSR’s post-war growth. It remains hemmed in by geography while potential balancers such as Japan, India, and Australia all retain significant latent capabilities that could be devoted to defense; many such counter-balancers have given strong signals of their inclination to oppose Chinese aggrandizement.52 These points also interact, giving a defensive advantage to many of the states along China’s periphery and underlining that a Chinese quest for regional hegemony or sphere of influence can be opposed by states positioned to help frustrate Chinese ambitions.

In essence, China is a threat, but it may not be the near-hegemon poised to ride roughshod over East Asia, cowing all local actors or carving off a sphere of influence, that neo-primacy assumes. By making more of the China threat than warranted, neo-primacy thereby risks creating a broader and deeper contest with Beijing than is warranted.

### AT: Authoritarianism

#### 1---non-unique AND alt cause---Trump thumped and other leaders are alt causes AND heg links too!

1AC Orts 18, University of Pennsylvania Guardsmark Professor at The Wharton School

[Eric, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” 6-27-18, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts, accessed 2020]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are **authoritarian and nationalist**. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: **nationalist wars** with risks of **escalation into global nuclear conflict**, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters. The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism, and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe.

### !D---Transition Wars

#### Decline solves transition conflict---only clinging causes war.

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In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

#### \*Transition is peaceful---bipolarity is stable, and institutions and economics cap escalation.

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One of the contemporary issues in international relations is that the current hegemon, the United States, has undergone a relative decline. It is argued that American hegemony that emerged aftermath the Second World War is undergoing a decline and with the rise of a potential challenger in China looming, one major issue concerning IR scholars is whether or not the relative decline of US hegemony will result in a hegemonic war.

Hegemonic wars occur when a rising challenger – revisionist power – isn’t content with the current international order and wants to change it so as to become a preponderant force and dictate terms of a new world order. This article assumes that although the US is in a relative decline it is still a dominant power and the rising power is content with the current status quo so no war occurs between the dominant and the rising power. In order to support the argument that a hegemonic war does not occur, this article provides explanation using several theoretical perspectives.

Structural Realism and Balance of Power

To begin with, prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz contends that the end of the Cold War has changed the structure of international politics from bipolar to unipolar with the US being the dominant power. According to Waltz, days of US being unipolar force in world politics is numbered and slowly the world is moving towards bipolarity or multipolarity because changes in the structure of international system brings about changes in state behavior. It does not matter how much self-restraint and self-control a preponderant power is in its conduct of international relations; states are always wary and fear the dominant power and thus he maintains that balancing is universal. [1]

In order to explain why, he has resorted to the Balance of Power (theory). In most basic sense, international politics is a state of anarchy where there is no central government and states rely on themselves to protect their autonomy and perpetuate their survival. Balance of Power contends that states involve in a balancing act to check the powers of preponderant force so that no any single state has enough power to become a global hegemon. [2]

With the relative decline of US, China and America can enter into bipolar relationship much like the US and the USSR during the Cold War. Since Waltz himself posits bipolarity as the most stable of international configurations, it can be argued that act of balancing between the US and China brings the international distribution of power into an equilibrium and averts the risk of war.

Socialization of Hegemonic Power

Most scholars posit that hegemons use threats and rewards to get compliance from secondary states. Contrary to popular wisdom, scholars Ikenberry and Kupchan have contended that in addition to material power, hegemons also have the power of socialization to achieve compliance from secondary states. They call this the socialization process which involves ‘altering of the belief systems’ of elites.

Basically, hegemons project their vision of international order through normative principles (norms and values) and not by material incentives; elites in secondary states internalize them, and devise policies that are compatible to the hegemon’s ideal of the international order. The authors contend that the world order thus created can sustain even when hegemon undergoes a decline because the world order created is relatively inexpensive to maintain in the sense that altering of states preferences are by virtue of ideals rather than use of coercion. Thus, by virtue of socialization of hegemonic power, relative changes in hegemon’s distribution of material power (military and economy) does not put strain on the international system.

So, on viewing the world from the lens of socialization, it can be argued that the expansion of US normative principles on liberal economic norm to its former allies and enemies aftermath the second world war that led to the formation of the current liberal economic world order provides an explanation as to why in spite of US’ relative decline there is continuity for America’s liberal economic order. [3] The rising challenger China can be considered to have been socialized – it has accepted US led international norms, and participates in various International Organizations. Thus, it makes less sense for China to wage war against the hegemon whose ideals it has internalized.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system.

The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. [4]

By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted. [5]

Robert Keohane and Institutionalist Approach

In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane uses an institutional approach to explain inter-state cooperation. He posits that states have common interest and in order to realize it requires achieving mutually beneficial agreements which is where international regimes come in. These regimes foster cooperation by making it easier to reach mutually beneficial inter-state agreements. They help overcome the problem of lack of qualitative and asymmetrical information, through institutional embeddedness reduces transaction costs, legal costs reduce incentive to cheat thereby reducing uncertainty and building confidence among states. Since hegemonic leadership is required to create regimes in the first place, even after the erosion of hegemony, they have high stakes and play important role in fostering cooperation (US role in the IMF and WTO). Because cooperation fosters absolute gain, all participants are benefitted. [6] By this approach, states see cooperation more beneficial than conflict. Thus, it can be argued from institutionalist approach that international regimes foster cooperation thereby reducing likelihood of conflict in the event of hegemonic decline.

### 2NC ⁠— AT: Russia

#### Attempting to maintain hegemony over Russia backfires and triggers nuclear cyber-war.

Beebe 19, vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, former head of Russia analysis at the CIA. (George, 10-7-2019, "We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think", *POLITICO Magazine*, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436>)

The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently?

But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects.

In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger.

Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces over Ukraine, Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to [preclude] ~~disable~~ our ability to conduct nuclear strikes. This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “use it or lose it” nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia necessary for managing such situations are all but severed.

A related, second assumption American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a deterrence problem. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, Washington seems convinced that showing the Kremlin it will punish Russian transgressions—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—is the best path to preserving peace.

But, when dealing with states that believe they are under some form of assault, focusing on deterrence can be counterproductive. Rather than averting aggression by demonstrating the will to fight back, America might be unintentionally increasing the odds of a war. To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. Years of enlargement of NATO and perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs have convinced the Kremlin that America poses an existential threat. In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular.

The United States experienced this spiral phenomenon with Georgia in 2008. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, Washington policymakers accelerated U.S. military training in Georgia, openly advocated bringing Tbilisi into the NATO alliance and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, believing this firm resolve would deter Russian aggression. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Russia grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Georgian membership in NATO, while Tbilisi felt emboldened to launch a military operation in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, which yielded an immediate and massive Russian military response.

#### \*Russian leaders are predisposed to misread deterrence measures as offensively motivated---that breaks deterrence

Pezard & Rhoades 20, Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation whose research focuses on European security and transatlantic relations, Ashley Rhoades is a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C (Stephanie and Ashley, January 2020, “What Provokes Putin’s Russia?: Deterring Without Unintended Escalation”, *RAND*, pg. 15-16, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE338/RAND\_PE338.pdf)

General Risks of Deterrence Against a Russian Adversary

Although the United States and its allies can make every effort to send clear signals and communicate effectively with Russian leadership, there is always a risk that Russia will misinterpret U.S. and NATO actions. A variety of factors beyond the control of the deterring party—including cultural differences, cognitive biases, irrational behavior, and flawed assumptions—can cause the target state to misread or misjudge the actions of its adversary.99 Domestic concerns or political constraints can also color how a state perceives and reacts to the actions of its adversary. One potent example of misperception occurred in 1983, when the Russians mistook a NATO nuclear warfare exercise called “Able Archer” as a cover for an actual nuclear strike, and nearly retaliated in kind.100 Only belatedly did then-President Ronald Reagan come to the realization that

[m]any people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans … many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But … I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike. … 101

This incident illustrates the importance of trying to understand how the other side will interpret one’s actions and the dangers of presuming that the adversary will share the same logic and assumptions.

Moreover, Russia tends to view any defense- or security-related actions taken by the United States or NATO in the European theater as being targeted at it, regardless of the actual intent behind these actions. As one RAND report notes,

Any actions in Europe to support American operations elsewhere have been and will be observed by a Russian military more interested in us than we are in it. It is critical that operational planning take this into account and that planners and operators take steps to prevent Russia from mistaking operations and actions as unintended “signals.”102

Of course, Russia may also make such claims about perceived U.S. and NATO “aggression” with the aim of justifying its own defense- or security-related actions. Whether rooted in genuine concern over U.S. actions or political theater, the reality is that Russia frequently does not modulate its responses based on the perceived or stated U.S. intent behind its actions, but rather reacts to transgressions of its redlines irrespective of the reason behind the violation. Nonetheless, if U.S. and NATO planners fail to account for Russian sensitivities and assumptions when deciding on courses of action, seemingly minor or irrelevant actions could inadvertently trigger escalation with Russia.

Deterrence strategies must also be designed with careful consideration of the broader context and environment in which they will be applied. Because some deterrence measures take a long time to implement, the context might have changed by the time they are enacted, which can “inadvertently signal aggressive intent under changed circumstances.”103 A recent example was the timing of events when NATO revealed, in May 2016, that it had installed a missile defense site in Romania and was beginning work on a site in Poland. At the same time, NATO announced a series of unconnected posture-enhancement proposals in preparation for the approaching Warsaw Summit. The coincidence of these actions further convinced Russia that it is the intended recipient of those ballistic missile defense systems, despite U.S. assurances to the contrary. In a similar vein, multiple deterrent actions undertaken in a short time span can have the cumulative effect of crossing a redline, even if the individual actions would not have had such a significant effect. For instance, the placement of newly developed Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany the same year as the Able Archer exercise drastically raised tensions and Soviet paranoia over U.S. and NATO actions, leading to the Soviet decision to raise its nuclear alert statuses and prepare for nuclear war. Policymakers therefore should “consider delaying final completion or announcements of posture enhancements that may take place during times of heightened tension and should routinely reassess posture decisions in the process of being implemented.”104 Otherwise, actions that would strengthen deterrence under different circumstances may counterproductively increase the risk of escalation.

### O/V ⁠— 2NC

### Impact Run — 2NC

#### Turns disease

Morand & Walther 20 (\*Serge Morand; PhD, disease ecologist @ Kasetsart University; \*\*Bruno A. Walther; DPhil, Taipei Medical University; 4/20/20; “The accelerated infectious disease risk in the Anthropocene: more outbreaks and wider global spread”; pg. 3-4; Accessible at: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.20.049866>) \*”to” added to preserve grammatical integrity, brackets denote a change

We here want to draw attention to another important and noteworthy feature of the Anthropocene which greatly affects public health, human well-being, and economic performance. These findings are especially pertinent as the world reels from the health, social and economic impact of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (El Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020; Ghebreyesus and Swaminathan, 2020; Lorusso et al., 2020). The increasing connectivity of human populations due to international trade and travel (Guimerà et al., 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Brockmann and Helbing, 2013; Gabrielli et al., 2019), the rapid growth of the transport of wild and domesticated animals worldwide (Rosen and Smith, 2010; Schneider, 2012; Rohr et al., 2019; Levitt, 2020), and other factors such as the increasing encroachment of human populations on hitherto isolated wild animal populations through loss and fragmentation of wild habitats (Patz et al., 2004; Despommier et al., 2006; Pongsiri et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2013) have led to a great acceleration of infectious disease risks, e.g., the increase in emerging infectious diseases and drug-resistant microbes since 1940 (Jones et al., 2008) and the increase in the number of disease outbreaks since 1980 (Smith et al., 2014). To expand the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014) to the beginning of the Anthropocene, we investigated whether the number of disease outbreaks has increased since the Second World War. In addition, we examined whether the global pattern of infectious disease outbreaks changed possibly due [to] the increasing connectivity of human populations. In other words, have the disease outbreaks become more globalized in the sense that these outbreaks are increasingly shared by countries worldwide? To investigate these questions, we used a the most complete, reliable, and up-to-date global dataset (GIDEON Informatics, 2020) which had already been used in the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014). This dataset can be used to enumerated the recorded annual number of disease outbreaks. To investigate the changing global patterns of disease outbreaks, we used this dataset to calculate two measures which have been recently introduced into ecological and parasitological studies. These two measures, namely modularity and centrality, quantify the connectivity of bipartite networks. Modularity is defined as the extent to which nodes (specifically, sites and species for presenceabsence matrices) in a compartment are more likely to be connected to each other than to other nodes of the network (Thébault, 2013). The calculation of a modularity measure is useful for global phenomena because it allows the overall level of compartmentalization (or fragmentation) into compartments (or clusters, modules, subgroups, or subsets) of an entire dataset to be quantified. High modularity in a global network means that subgroups of countries and disease outbreaks interact more strongly among themselves (that is, within a compartment) than with the other subgroups (that is, among compartments) (Bordes et al., 2015). Centrality is defined as the degree of the connectedness of a node (e.g., a keystone species in ecological studies; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010). In the context of our study, centrality is the degree of the connectedness of a country and those countries connected to it. We estimated the countries which are the potential centres of disease outbreaks by investigating the eigenvector centrality of a given country in a network of countries which share disease outbreaks among each other. Eigenvector centrality is a generalization of degree centrality, which is the number of connections a country has to other countries in terms of sharing disease outbreaks. Eigenvector centrality considers countries to be highly central if the connected countries to them through shared outbreaks are connected to many other well-connected countries (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001; Wells et al., 2020). Modularity and centrality analyses have been used to investigate various ecological, parasitological and epidemiological questions (e.g., Tylianakis et al., 2007; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010; Anderson and Sukhdeo, 2011; Bascompte and Jordano, 2014; Poisot et al., 2014; Bordes et al., 2015; Genrich et al., 2017). Using a widely used world dataset on infectious disease outbreaks, we here present results which demonstrate that the accelerated number of disease outbreaks and their increased global spread are two further threatening aspects of the accelerated infectious disease risk associated with the globalization process which characterizes the Anthropocene.

#### 2. Chemical emissions.

Julian Cribb 17, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2017, “The Poisoner,” in Surviving the 21st Century, p. 113-117

There are two essential points about the Earthwide chemical flood. First it is quite new. It began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which we, in consequence, lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons. ¶ Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but is an unwanted by-product of economic growth. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. ¶ The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. ¶ Regulatory Failure ¶ Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. Regulation has so far failed to make any serious curtailment of this flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. ¶ Furthermore, the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) and into developing countries, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, its toxic emissions return to citizens in well-regulated countries via wind, water, food, wildlife, consumer goods, industrial products and people. The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. ¶ The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. ¶ Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. ¶ Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues.¶ Chemical Extinction ¶ Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. ¶ While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilization, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include: Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics.

#### 3. Soil erosion causes extinction.

George Monbiot 15, author and investigative reporter, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal mistake, as our lives depend on it,” 3/25/15, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-mistake-human-life

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper.It’s literally and – it seems – metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”The issue hasn’t changed, but we have. Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we have “only 100 harvests left”.To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it, then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt.The techniques that were supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the intensification of farming over the past century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen. This is one of the reasons why allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change.Few sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a parable of our times.Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it.The government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-business agenda” is deregulating us to death.There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university – Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.This is what topples civilisations. War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose the soil and everything goes with it.Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth, it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.Almost all other issues are superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady trickling away of our subsistence.

#### 4. Insect loss.

Robert Hunziker 18, MA in Economic History from DePaul University, environmental journalist for over fifty publications, 3/27/18, “Insect Decimation Upstages Global Warming,” https://www.transcend.org/tms/2018/04/insect-decimation-upstages-global-warming/

Everybody’s heard about global warming. It is one of the most advertised existential events of all time. Who isn’t aware? However, there’s a new kid on the block. An alarming loss of insects will likely take down humanity before global warming hits maximum velocity.¶ For the immediate future, the Paris Accord is riding the wrong horse, as global warming is a long-term project compared to the insect catastrophe happening right now! Where else is found 40% to 90% species devastation?¶ The worldwide loss of insects is simply staggering with some reports of 75% up to 90%, happening much faster than the paleoclimate record rate of the past five major extinction events. It is possible that some insect species may already be close to total extinction!¶ It’s established that species evolve and then go extinct over thousands and millions of years as part of nature’s course, but the current rate of devastation is simply “off the charts, and downright scary.”¶ Without any doubt, it is difficult to imagine how humanity survives without insects, which are dropping dead in bunches right before our eyes. For proof, how many insect splats do people clean off windshields nowadays? Not many…. How many fireflies do children chase at night? Not many….¶ Several naturalists and environmental writers believe the massive loss of insects has everything to do with three generations of industrialized farming and the vast tide of poisons pouring over the landscape year-after-year, especially since the end of WWII. Ours is the first-ever pesticide-based agricultural society. Dreadfully, it’s an experiment that is going dead wrong… all of a sudden!¶ Insects are basic to thousands of food chains; for example, the disappearance of Britain’s farmland birds by over 50% in 40 years. Additionally, North America and Europe species of birds like larks, swallows, and swifts that feast on flying insects have plummeted.¶ But, these are only a few of many, many recorded examples of massive numbers of wildlife dropping dead right before our eyes.¶ Significantly, insects are the primary source for ecosystem creation and support. The world literally crumbles apart without mischievous burrowing, forming new soil, aerating soil, pollinating food crops, etc. Nutrition for humans happens because insects pollinate.

#### 5. Deforestation

Dominik Goldstein 16, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,” <http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf>

Deforestation and forest degradation are undoubtedly part of the largest environmental problems our world is facing today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. Not only does this threaten the balance of local important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas decomposition and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but it also endangers many different species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests. The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests, it is vital that the issues of deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations.

### AT: Trade (Offense) — 1NC/2NC

#### Interdependence causes war---empirics and asymmetry---can’t overcome fundamental disagreements.

van de Haar 20 (Edwin, independent scholar specializing in the liberal tradition in international political thought. He has lectured in international relations and political theory at Brown University, PhD from Maastricht University (2008), a MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (1997) and a MA in Political Science from Leiden University (1996), “Free trade does not foster peace,” 2020, DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12405, DOA: 1-5-2020) //Snowball //strikethrough of rhetoric

The most obvious rebuttal of these arguments is empirical. It just did not happen. Countries trading with each other, all around the globe, have fought wars with one another, over and over again. Some recent examples are Russia and Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As Smith predicted, human nature is an important factor in the explanation. People will quarrel and fight: ultimately emotions rule reason. In the domestic situation, there is hardly anyone who thinks that people can do without police and judiciary, because some people simply will not obey the rules. The international system is without a court with enforcement powers. There are some structural constraints, but it remains a human affair. The fundamental insights of Smith and his contemporaries into human behaviour do not amount to some oldfashioned idea, long refuted by modern science. They are confirmed not only by modern economists such as Kahneman (2011) and international relations specialists such as Waltz (1954, pp. 16–79) and Donelan (2007), but also by theorists working on the border between evolutionary psychology and international affairs (Rosen, 2005; Rubin, 2002; Thayer, 2004).

The relationship between trade and economic interdependence is also far more complex. Economic interdependence matters sometimes, but it cannot trump power politics. As Copeland (2015, pp. 1–50, 428–46) makes clear, economic interdependence is sometimes a constraint on violent action by a state. Yet it could just as well be a cause of violent action, especially of a pre-emptive nature in the event that actors expect to be cut off from trade and other economic resources in the near future. In this way, the benefits of continued trade lose out against the expected economic vulnerability. Sobek (2009, pp. 107–27) adds that trade relations might lead to uneven power relationships, which may be a cause of war as well.

Also relevant here is the fact that free trade does not normally result in bilateral interdependence, except for trade in the rarest goods. Free trade leads to multilateral trade relations, and consequently there may be more than one country where particular goods can be bought. Therefore, in times of war, it is relatively easy to switch to suppliers from country A to country B or C. In this way warfare may be a less costly option than is assumed by the idea of economic interdependence.

Public opinion is not automatically opposed to war, as Cobden painfully found out during the Crimean War (1853–56). This has been evident many times since, not least in the two world wars. So the idea of public opinion as a pacifying factor influencing decision-makers must be discarded. It must also be noted that the public in any case hardly ever influences foreign policy decisions on war and peace (Hill, 2003, pp. 250–82).

Trade is unable to foster peace, because it is unable to overcome many causes of war. Think about cultural and religious differences, geopolitical causes such as the fight for natural resources, including increasingly rare raw materials, or more traditional wars between great powers or their proxies over a border dispute. States may also act against their economic interest for some perceived higher goal (Coker, 2014). The causes of war are often multifaceted and complex. Wars happen because people have reasons to fight, in the form of goals and grievances, and possess enough resources and resolve (Ohlson, 2009). Trade relations are just one factor in the mix of causes of war, which include such coincidental factors as chance, luck, or reckless behaviour by individuals who happen to influence public policy. International commerce is simply not a “perfectly effective antiwar device” (Suganami, 1996, pp. 153–210). The best one can say is that the protection of trade relations is sometimes one of the factors in the decision not to wage war. Nothing less, nothing more.

To sum up, many of Adam Smith's arguments still stand, and are confirmed or complemented by modern research. There is no solid ground for the expectation that trade promotes, fosters, or leads to peace. Generally, international economic interests are not the crucial factors in decisions over war and peace. Too many other factors come into play. To believe that trade fosters peace was folly even hundreds of years ago. To still think so is to believe in fairy tales, to be ~~blinded~~ [confused] by the correlates computed by limited yet available datasets, or both.

### Perm 1 and 2

### At: warming

### AT: sustainability

#### Can’t solve warming ⁠— ignores regressions, outsourcing emissions, AND our ev assumes best-case scenarios

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Can Economies Grow as Carbon Emissions Fall?

All economic activity requires energy; to the extent, this energy comes from fossil fuels, the energy use results in emissions of CO2.8 This linkage implies that deep emissions reduction will constrain economic growth unless there is decoupling—meaning that drastic emission reductions are possible with little or no effect on growth. An instructive device for analyzing the linkage (or decoupling) of growth and CO2 emissions is the well-known Kaya identity (Kaya and Yokobori 1997), which decomposes global CO2 emissions (in million tonnes), denoted by C, into measurable “drivers” directly relevant to climate and energy policy: C=P×YP×CE×EY=P×y×c×e (1) where P = world population (billions of persons), Y = world GDP (in 2010 US$), E = total primary energy supply or TPES (in PJ), y = global per-capita income (in 2010 US$), c = C/E = carbon intensity of primary energy supply, or CO2 emissions per TPES, and e = E/Y = energy intensity of GDP. External factors influence the variables that make up the identity, and the variables interact with one another in various ways. Whatever the underlying causal mechanisms, the identity has to be satisfied ex-post. Carbon emissions rise, ceteris paribus when world population increases and/or when per-capita income rises. Emissions decline when energy intensity declines, for example, when higher energy prices cause firms to make energy efficiency investments that reduce the amount of energy needed to produce output. Carbon intensity declines when the share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation increases and the share of fossil-fuel energy goes down. In the growth-rate from the Kaya identity can be approximated by: Global carbon emissions growth is driven by population growth Pˆ, per-capita income growth yˆ, the growth of the carbon intensity of energy cˆ, and the growth of energy intensity of GDP eˆ. Table 1 shows the results of a decomposition of global CO2 emissions for the period 1971–2017 and our projection for the period 2017–2050, which satisfies Equation (2). We focus on CO2 emissions from the energy system which represent more than 70% of global GHG emissions in 2010.9 [Table 1 omitted] Let us first consider historical changes during 1971–2017 when global CO2 emissions increased by 1.88% yr−1. Growth in the population (at 1.52% yr−1) and in per capita real GDP (at 1.49% yr−1) exerted upward pressure on CO2 emissions, which was only partially offset by downward pressure from higher energy efficiency (energy intensity declined by 0.96% yr−1) and lower carbon intensity (which declined by 0.17% yr−1).10 These downward trends in energy and carbon intensity are still insufficient to delink economic growth and carbon emissions. Table 1 signals some improvement over time however, as energy intensity has begun to decline appreciably faster post-1990, recording a decline of 1.05% yr−1 during 1991–2017 as compared to 0.86% during 1971–1990. There is no similar sign of declining carbon intensity—the carbon intensity declined by 0.41% yr−1 during 1971–1990 but did not decline further during 1991–2017 Global average changes are the net outcomes of underlying regional changes. Table 2 shows the Kaya decomposition results for the OECD countries and the non-OECD countries, as well as separately for the U.S.A., the E.U.-28, China, India, and Indonesia, for the period 1971–2017. Country trajectories differ, but there are four general developments that are of critical importance to changes in emission trajectories. First, population growth has been lower during 1991-2017 compared to 1971-1990, leading to lower CO2 emissions growth; this declining trend will continue during the rest of this century. Second, all countries experienced negative energy intensity growth—in the OECD countries during 1991–2017, the improved energy efficiency more than offset the upward pressure on carbon emissions coming from per capita income growth. Third, the E.U.-28 and the U.S.A. exhibit negative carbon intensity growth, but somewhat worryingly, the rate of de-carbonization in the OECD has been slowing down during 1991–2017 compared to the years 1971–1990. The E.U. carbon intensity decline recorded during 1991–2017 is dominated by the growing share of (zero-carbon) renewables in total energy use, particularly due to Germany’s Energiewende (cf. Peters et al. 2017, 120). The non-OECD countries as a whole experienced somewhat lower carbon intensity growth during 1971–2017, as China, India, and Indonesia managed to substantially lower their (still high) carbon intensity growth rates. For instance, China brought down carbon intensity growth from 0.85% yr−1 during 1971–1990 to 0.27% yr−1 during 1991–2017, mostly because it reduced the share of fossil fuels in total energy use, and especially of coal (Grubb et al. 2015; Peters et al. 2017, 119; Guan et al. 2018). Finally, neither in the OECD nor in the non-OECD countries are the negative energy intensity growth and the declining carbon intensity growth large enough to ensure a decoupling of growth of CO2 emissions and growth of real GDP. The world as a whole has achieved only relative decoupling but no absolute decline in carbon emissions during 1971–1990 and 1991–2017. [Table 2 omitted] The greatest potential for drastic cuts in emissions lies in the deep de-carbonization of energy systems (Geels et al. 2017), which is exactly what emission scenarios consistent with COP21 indicate (Peters et al. 2017). The potential is largest in the non-OECD countries, where “low-hanging fruit” could be harvested by means of a rapid phasing out of coal, an equally rapid “phasing in” of renewable energies, enhancing the biosphere and carbon sinks, and the large-scale deployment of CCS. But most models cannot identify emission pathways consistent with the 66% “below 2 °C” goal without a large-scale ramp-up of CCS facilities (Peters et al. 2017, 121). It should be obvious that past and current trends in energy and carbon intensity are woefully inconsistent with future pathways that would stabilize the climate at temperature rises well below 2 °C—continuing with business-as-usual will irreversibly put the Earth System onto a “Hothouse Earth” pathway (Steffen et al. 2018). “The challenge that humanity faces,” write Steffen et al. (2018, 3), “is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth.” The key issue is what the deep emissions reductions will mean for economic growth. Can we stabilize the climate system while growing the economy? A tentative growth projection for the period 2017–2050 is provided in the last two columns of Table 1. We use the transparent Kaya identity in growth rate form to explore the scope for economic growth in a climate-constrained world: yˆ=Cˆ−Pˆ−cˆ−eˆ (3) We assign values to the right side of Equation (3) to determine per-capita real income growth. First, we adopt the United Nation’s population projection (the “medium variant” from UN DESA 2015), which implies Pˆ = 0.79% yr−1 until 2050. Next, in line with the “2050 Low Carbon Economy Roadmap” adopted by the E.U., we assume that global CO2 emissions in 2050 will be 85% lower than in 1990; this implies an annual average reduction in global carbon emissions Cˆ by 6.92% yr−1. Our numbers refer to CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels in the energy sector. The latest IPCC target—net zero emissions by 2050—refers to all climate-relevant GHGs (IPCC 2018). CO2 emissions from land-use changes and the transport sector, as well as other GHG emissions, are probably harder to reduce or more expensive to reduce than energy-sector CO2 emissions; and it is doubtful that negative-emission technologies can be ramped up to the equivalent of 15% of the 1990 global emissions level. Therefore the 85% reduction target is a soft one (the IPCC target is stricter). Next, we borrow from the OECD (2017, Table 2.18) the projected decreases in energy intensity and carbon intensity: eˆ = −2.69% yr−1 and cˆ = −3.68% yr−1. These ambitious intensity reductions originally come from the IEA-IRENA 66% 2 °C scenario (IEA-IRENA 2017), which refers to the G20, and we assume they apply to the whole world. Based on the assumptions made, the climate-constrained growth rate of global real per-capita income is found to be negative (−1.34%yr−1) during the next three decades: yˆ=Cˆ−Pˆ−cˆ−eˆ=−6.92%−0.79%+3.68%+2.69%=−1.34% (4) Even with a relatively “soft” emission-reduction target, climate-constrained growth is not just well below the historical income growth rate (of 1.49%yr−1 during 1971–2017), but negative—which means there is a conflict between growing the world economy and keeping global warming from becoming dangerous and unstoppable. The sobering bottom line is this: taking the 85% reduction target as given, even under the techno-optimistic assumption that we manage to bring about historically unprecedented reductions in carbon intensity and energy intensity, the climate constraint is binding in the sense that future global economic growth would have to be not just significantly lower than historical growth, but even negative.11 An argument in favor of greater scope for economic growth has to rely on even more optimistic assumptions concerning technological progress—even more potent climate policies would have to be adopted to bring about even sharper reductions in carbon intensity and energy intensity. The growth implications of uncompromising climate policies are not obvious. Our plea is that we do whatever it takes to force through the technological, structural and societal changes needed to reduce carbon emissions so as to stabilize warming at 1.5 °C (Grubb 2014; Steffen et al. 2018) and just accept whatever consequences this has in terms of economic growth.

Is Obama Right about Decoupling?

The only way the world can meet the COP21 target is by a permanent absolute decoupling of growth and CO2 emissions (de Bruyn and Opschoor 1997; Ward et al. 2016). As shown in Tables 1 and 2 absolute decoupling over long periods remains elusive both in the OECD and non-OECD countries (as a whole). But what about recent individual country experiences: is there a group of leading high-income countries, including the U.S., that are growing their GDP while at the same time reducing their carbon emissions? Can we indeed put to rest the argument that halting warming requires accepting lower growth, as Obama argues? We systematically investigate the hypothesis that today’s high-income countries have crossed the turning point of the ubiquitous “inverted U-shaped” CKC (see Dinda 2004; Kaika and Zervas 2013a, 2013b; Stern 2017). The CKC hypothesis holds that CO2 emissions per person do initially increase with rising per capita income (due to industrialization), then peak and decline after a threshold level of per capita GDP, as countries arguably become more energy-efficient, more technologically sophisticated and more inclined to and able to reduce emissions by corresponding legislation and enforcement. The large empirical and methodological literature12 on the CKC does not provide unambiguous and robust evidence of a CKC peaking for carbon dioxide, if only because of well documented but yet unresolved econometric problems concerning the appropriateness of model specification and estimation strategies (e.g., Wagner 2008). We will leave these econometric issues aside however and instead focus on the fact that the majority of empirical CKC studies use territorial or PB emissions data to test the CKC hypothesis (Mir and Storm 2016)—and hence overlook the emissions embodied in international trade and in global commodity chains (Peters et al. 2011). Based on IPCC guidelines, GHG emissions are counted as the national emissions coming from domestic production. This geographical definition hides the GHG emissions embodied in international trade. Rich countries including the EU-27 and the United States. with high average consumption levels are known to be net carbon importers as the CO2 emissions embodied in their exports are lower than the emissions embodied in their imports (Nakano et al. 2009; Boitier 2012; Agrawala et al. 2013). Vice versa, most developing (and industrializing) countries are net carbon exporters. What this implies is that, because of cross-border carbon leakages, CB emissions are higher than PB emissions in the OECD countries but lower in the developing countries (Aichele and Felbermayr 2012). This indicates that while there may well be a Kuznets-like delinking between per-capita income and per-capita PB emissions, it is as yet unclear whether such delinking is also occurring in terms of CB emissions (e.g., Rosa and Dietz 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; Jorgenson 2014; Mir and Storm 2016).13 If not, the notion of “carbon decoupling” has to be rethought—in terms of a delinking between income and CB emissions. After all, it is no great achievement to reduce domestic per capita carbon emissions by outsourcing carbon-intensive activities to other countries and by being a net importer of GHG, while raising consumption and living standards (e.g., Rothman 1998; Bagliani, Bravo, and Dalmazzone 2008).

Estimating the Turning Points of Production-Based and Consumption-Based CKCs

Method

To evaluate the CKC hypothesis we run standard panel data regressions of per-capita CO2 emissions on per-capita income and per-capita income squared. The data and replication files are available as part of the supplementary materials on the article webpage. The population model includes country-specific effects and time-specific effects: lnco2=β0+β1⋅ln y+β2⋅(ln y)2+αt+ai+u (5) The dependent variable, co2, is either PB per-capita CO2 emissions or CB per-capita CO2 emissions. y is “real” per-capita GDP, and u is the unobserved disturbance term. t = 1, 2, …, T indexes time periods, and i = 1, 2, …, n indexes countries. αt is a time-specific effect, and ai is a country-specific effect (the population model, as written here, includes a regression constant, so ∑tαt=0 and ∑iai=0). The model restricts all countries to have a common turning point while allowing the level of emissions at the turning point to differ across countries. Turning points TP are calculated as TP=exp(−βˆ12βˆ2) (6) where the hat “∧” from now on denotes an estimate of the corresponding population parameter. The country-specific effect captures, for instance, a country’s endowment with fossil fuels. This interpretation immediately suggests that ai correlates with y; after all, a large resource endowment can be expected to increase a country’s income. The fixed-effect estimator (FE) addresses this endogeneity problem. The cross-country panel is short (large n, small T). The time-specific effects are estimated by the inclusion of dummy variables in the regressor vector. Equation (5) represents the “standard EKC regression model” (Stern 2017, 13), relating the log of per-capita emissions to the log of per-capita income. With the fixed-effects estimator, we are using the most common, tried, and tested estimation method. Alternative estimation methods including non-parametric ones tend to produce similar results (Stern 2017). The fixed-effects estimator exploits the variation over time to estimate the parameters of the model in Equation (5). Over a time period of one or two decades, the within-variation is relatively small compared to the variation across countries. Consequently, the standard errors will be relatively large. This is the price to pay for the ability to control for country-specific effects. Structural change means that the parameters of the model (5) will in general not be constant over time, but given our time horizon of one or two decades, there is no point in testing for structural breaks. When predicting the level of per-capita CO2 emissions for the average country, we use Duan’s smearing estimate to address the re-transformation bias (Duan 1983). Simply re-transforming the estimated conditional expectation would lead to underestimation of the per-capita emission level. We predict the per-capita emissions level at the mean of the estimated time-specific effects and the mean of the (implicitly) estimated country-specific effects: co2ˆ0=h⋅exp(βˆ0+βˆ1⋅ln y0+βˆ2⋅(ln y0)2+1T∑Tt=2aˆt) (7) where h=N−1∑i∑t exp(aˆi+uˆit) is the adjustment factor. aˆi+uˆit is the combined residual, the sum of the implicitly estimated country-specific effect and the idiosyncratic residual. Duan’s assumptions (homoscedasticity and i.i.d. data) are not satisfied here (heteroscedasticity and possible dependence across time), but it is better to make the adjustment than to knowingly underestimate the per-capita emission level.


Data

Our primary CO2 emissions data come from TECO2, the OECD’s Trade-in Embodied CO2 Database (OECD, 2019).14 The database, described in Wiebe and Yamano (2016), provides county-level estimates of CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. This emissions concept excludes CO2 emissions from land-use change and forest fires, fugitive emissions, and emissions from industrial processes. The independent variable, co2, is defined as either PB emissions divided by population or CB emissions divided by population (kg CO2 per person). TECO2 covers 64 countries between 2005–2015. The GDP and population variables come from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). The income variable, y, is defined as expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs in 2011 US$ (PWT variable code “rgdpe”) divided by population (“pop”). We simply write “dollars” or “dollars per person” to refer to this unit. We work with non-overlapping three-year averages to reduce measurement error and focus on structural relationships. We exclude small countries from our main estimation sample; more specifically, we exclude countries with a 1990–2015-average population below the first quartile in the PWT (fewer than 1.92 million people). The main estimation sample has N = 174 observations with n = 58 and T = 3. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the main sample (based on TECO2) and the other two samples. The mean per-capita income level in the main sample is $28,000, the minimum income is $2300 (Cambodia), and the maximum income is $75,000 (Singapore). The majority of countries in the main sample are high-income countries; income at the first quartile is $15,000. PB emissions range from 310 to 23,105 kg CO2 per person, and CB emissions range from 527 to 20,867 kg CO2 per person. The 58 countries account for 85% of global emissions in 2015 (both in terms of PB accounting and in terms of CB accounting). [Table 3 omitted]

Robustness

We adjust the baseline regressions in a number of ways to assess the robustness of the results. We include linear and quadratic time trends; we vary the observation frequency by switching from three-year non-overlapping averages to annual data; we include the small countries that are excluded from the main estimation sample; and finally, we use several sources for the CO2 emission data. This last robustness check is particularly important because the literature documents how country-level CB emission estimates vary with the underlying input-output table (Wiedmann et al. 2011; Moran and Wood 2014; Rodrigues et al. 2018; Wieland et al. 2018). Therefore, we source alternative CO2 emission data from Eora15 and the OECD-ICIO-201516. Both databases provide country-level estimates of PC and CB CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. Eora (Lenzen et al. 2013) covers 190 countries between 1990 and 2015. The OECD-ICIO-2015 (OECD 2015) covers 61 countries between 1995 and 2011.

Regression Results

Figure 1 plots CKCs for the “average country” and “average time period,” that is, it shows predicted emissions at varying income levels at the mean of the country-specific effects and the mean of the time-specific effects (the country-specific effects and the time-specific effects shift the intercept, moving the curves up or down). The curves in the upper panel are derived from regressions based on the main estimation sample. The regressions provide no evidence for the existence of a CKC, neither for PB emissions nor for CB emissions. Over the sample range, emissions monotonically increase with income. There is no turning point. Figure 1. The Carbon-Kuznets-Curve. Note: Based on calculations by the authors as described in the Method section. For the underlying fixed-effect estimations results, see Table 4, column 1, and Table 5, column 1. The CKCs are drawn as solid lines inside the range of observed per-capita incomes and as dotted lines outside the sample range (dotted when higher than the sample maximum or lower than the sample minimum).  The claim that eventually emissions will fall as income grows—there are turning points, but they are outside the sample range—would require a willingness to extrapolate the statistical relationship beyond the extreme values in the sample to an unobserved domain. The data determines the shape of the curve in the sample range, but it cannot tell us whether the population parameters and the functional form are stable at unobserved income levels. The statistical analysis of historical data cannot justify extrapolation. The fixed-effect regression that underpins Figure 1 is summarized in Table 4. Columns 1 and 4 report results from the baseline specification that includes time period dummies in the regressor vector. A Wald test for the joint significance of the time period dummies suggests that they should be included in the regression model (it rejects the null that the coefficients on the time period dummies are jointly zero). The signs of the regression coefficients are consistent with the existence of a CKC, but their magnitude implies turning points far outside the estimation sample range. In the case of CB emissions, the coefficient on the log of income squared is not statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting a linear positive relationship between emissions and income.17 Replacing the time period dummies with a linear time trend (columns 2 and 5) or with a quadratic time trend (columns 3 and 6) changes little: coefficient signs, magnitudes, and their statistical significance are essentially the same as in the specification with time period dummies. [Table 4 omitted] A different source for emissions data gives different results. We postulate the same statistical model and use the same estimation method but switch the emissions data source. The use of the OECD-ICIO-2015 database leads to the CKCs shown in the lower panel of Figure 1—now the turning points fall inside the estimation sample range. The turning point for PB emissions is at $39,000–$41,000 and the turning point for CB emissions is at nearly twice that level at $71,000–$78,000, near the estimation sample’s maximum. The underlying regressions are summarized in Table 5. In general, the OECD-ICIO-2015 yields more precise coefficient estimates (in the sense that the t ratios are higher than in the baseline regressions) because it covers a longer stretch of time and the fixed-effects estimator relies on time variation. The table reports six regressions that all support the existence of a CKC: the coefficients have the “right” signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. [Table 5 omitted] The appendix presents the results of several robustness tests. Table 6 replicates the analysis from Table 4 and 5, this time using Eora as the source for emissions data. The Eora sample contains more developing countries than the other two samples, which introduces additional variation in the dependent variable. The income variables and time dummies capture only a small fraction of this variation. The coefficients have the “right” signs, but are not statistically significant, even after excluding potential outliers (quantitative outlier tests could support the exclusion of observations from Belarus, Moldova, and Ethiopia). The lack of statistical significance stems in part from the high correlation between the log of income and the log of income squared. When either variable is included alone, its regression coefficient becomes statistically significant and indicates a positive relationship between income and emissions (regressions not reported). Table 7 adds six small countries that were excluded from the main estimation sample, meaning it uses data for all 64 countries covered by TECO2. The results are basically the same as in Table 4 and need no further commenting. Table 8 moves from the three-year non-overlapping averages to annual observations. Exploiting the high-frequency variation does improve the precision of the coefficient estimates, and the coefficient on the log of income squared turns up statistically significant. Changes to the size of the coefficients are minor. Overall TECO2 suggests that emissions monotonically increase with income, for the database produces no evidence of turning points inside the sample range, neither for PB emissions nor for CB emissions. [Tables 6-8 omitted] In the case of CB emissions, the regression coefficients vary with the source data (compare the columns 4–6 in Table 4 and Table 5). In the case of PB emissions, the coefficients hardly change. Yet even small changes in the coefficients generate large changes in the turning points (e.g., compare the columns 1–3 and 4–6 in Table 5) because the turning points are calculated as an exponential function of the ratio of the regression coefficients. Given this non-linearity, an innocuous switch of the source for emissions data has dramatic implications for the turning points. Therefore, the exact quantitative implications of the CKC analysis are to be interpreted with caution. Robust quantitative interpretations would presume a level of precision that no statistical analysis can deliver. The implied turning points, whether inside the sample range or outside, are higher for CB emissions than for PB emissions—this qualitative finding is robust and holds across all specifications.

Summing Up

Our econometric analysis yields three conclusions. First, the evidence in support of a CKC pattern for PB emissions is fragile at best. Only the OECD-ICIO-2015 database generates the inverted-U-shaped pattern. In any case, global economic development along the CKCs would not be compatible with the IPCC (2018) pathway consistent with keeping global warming below 1.5 °C. If China developed along the path of the production-based CKC, it would exhaust a third of the global carbon budget before even reaching the turning point.18 The production-based inverted U-shaped CKC is, in other words, not a relevant framework for climate change mitigation. Second, our results suggest that economic growth has not decoupled from CB emissions.19 Some of the OECD countries have managed to some extent to delink their production systems from CO2 emissions by relocating and outsourcing carbon-intensive production activities to the low-income countries. The generally used production-based GHG emissions data ignore the highly fragmented nature of global production chains (and networks) and are unable to reveal the ultimate driver of increasing CO2 emissions: consumption growth (Rosa and Dietz 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; Mir and Storm 2016). Corroborating evidence is provided by Jorgenson (2014) who finds that in North America, Europe, and Oceania, increases in human well-being (measured as life expectancy) are associated with a rising carbon intensity of well-being. Third, and most importantly, what the statistical analysis shows is that to avoid environmental catastrophe, the future must be different from the past. However, the dominant “green growth” approaches remain squarely within the realm of “business-as-usual” economics, proposing solutions which rely on technological fixes on the supply side and voluntary or “nudged” behavior change on the demand side, and which are bound to extend current unsustainable production, consumption and emission patterns into the future. The belief that any of this half-hearted tinkering will lead to drastic cuts in CO2 emissions in the future is altogether too reminiscent of Saint Augustine’s “Oh Lord, make me pure, but not yet.” If past performance is relevant for future outcomes, our results should put to bed the complacency concerning the possibility of “green growth.” We have to stop the self-deception.

#### The Ecomodernist Manifesto fabricates data, is tainted by pro-growth ideology, is condescending towards indigenous populations, and is flat out wrong.

Caradonna et al. ’15 (Jeremy; PhD, teaches Environmental Studies and the Human Dimensions of Climate Change at the University of Victoria; Iris Borowy, Tom Green, Peter A. Victor, Maurie Cohen, Andrew Gow, Anna Ignatyeva, Matthias Schmelzer, Philip Vergragt, Josefin Wangel, Jessica Dempsey, Robert Orzanna, Sylvia Lorek, Julian Axmann, Rob Duncan, Richard B. Norgaard, Halina S. Brown, Richard Heinberg; May 6th; “A Degrowth Response to an Ecomodernist Manifesto”; <https://www.resilience.org/stories/2015-05-06/a-degrowth-response-to-an-ecomodernist-manifesto/>; accessed 1/10/19; MSCOTT)

The Manifesto has already received strong criticism from an array of commentators, but none of these assessments has yet critiqued it from the perspective of “degrowth,” which is an approach that sees the transition to sustainability occurring through less environmentally impactful economic activities and a voluntary contraction of material throughput of the economy, to reduce humanity’s aggregate resource demands on the biosphere. From a degrowth perspective, technology is not viewed as a magical savior since many technologies actually accelerate environmental decline.

With these disagreements in mind, a group of over fifteen researchers from the degrowth scholarship community has written a detailed refutation of the Ecomodernist Manifesto, which can be read here. The following is a summary of the seven main points made by the authors of this critique:

1. The Manifesto assumes that growth is a given. The ecological economists associated with degrowth assume that growth is not a given, and that population growth, inequalities, and the decline of cheap and abundant fossil fuels, which spurred the unprecedented growth of the global economy over the past century, means that the limits to growth are either being reached or will be reached in the very near future. The ecomodernists, by contrast, scoff at the idea of limits to growth, arguing that technology will always find a way to overcome those limits. Graham Turner, Ugo Bardi, and numerous others have shown through empirical research that many of the modeled scenarios, and the fundamental thesis, of the Club of Rome remain as relevant as ever—that is, that the human endeavor is bumping up against natural limits. Richard Heinberg has shown that the production of conventional oil, natural gas, and heavy oil all peaked around 2010, despite, but also due to, continued global reliance on fossil fuels, which still make up over 80% of the world’s primary source of energy. The history of industrialism to date suggests that more growth will be coupled with increasing environmental costs. Thus, the Manifesto does nothing to question and rethink the growth fetish that has preoccupied (and negatively impacted) the world since at least the 1940s.

2. Ecomodernists believe in the myth of decoupling growth from impacts. Long the fantasy of neoclassical economists, industrialists, and many futurists decoupling is the idea that one can have more of the “good stuff” (economic growth, increased population, more consumption) without any of the “bad stuff” (declines in energy stocks, environmental degradation, pollution, and so forth). Yet to date, there has been no known society that has simultaneously expanded economic activity while reducing absolute energy consumption and environmental impacts. In terms of carbon-dioxide emissions, the only periods over the past century in which global or regional emissions have actually declined absolutely have occurred during periods of decreased economic activity (usually a political crisis, war, or a recession). While it is true that many countries have reduced their carbon intensity in recent decades, meaning that they get more bang for their energy buck, efforts to decouple GDP-growth from environmental degradation through technological innovations and renewable energies have failed to achieve the absolute emissions reductions and reductions in aggregate environmental impacts necessary for a livable planet. In short, absolute decoupling has not occurred and has not solved our problems.

3. Is technology the problem or the solution? The ecomodernists cannot decide. The Manifesto is open and honest about the impact that modern technologies have had on the natural world, and especially emissions from fossil-fueled machines. However, as an act of desperation, the ecomodernists retreat to the belief that risky, costly, and underachieving technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage, will solve the climate crisis and energize the sustainable society of the future. The reality, however, is that nuclear power provides less than 6 percent of the world’s energy needs while creating long-term storage nightmares and present-day environmental hazards. We cite Chernobyl and Fukushima as obvious examples. From the point of view of degrowth, more technology is not (necessarily) the solution. The energy crisis can be addressed only by reductions in throughput, economic activity, and consumption, which could then (and only then) create the possibility of powering global society via renewables.

4. Ecomodernism is not very “eco.” Ecomodernism violates everything we know about ecosystems, energy, population, and natural resources. Fatally, it ignores the lessons of ecology and thermodynamics, which teach us that species (and societies) have natural limits to growth. The ecomodernists, by contrast, brazenly claim that the limits to growth is a myth, and that human population and the economy could continue to grow almost indefinitely. Moreover, the ecomodernists ignore or downplay many of the ecological ramifications of growth. The Manifesto has nothing to say about the impacts of conventional farming, monoculture, pesticide-resistant insects, GMOs, and the increasing privatization of seeds and genetic material. It is silent on the decline of global fisheries or the accumulation of microplastic pollution in the oceans, reductions in biodiversity, threats to ecosystem services, and the extinction of species. Nor does it really question our reliance on fossil fuels. It does argue that societies need to “decarbonize,” but the Manifesto also tacitly supports coal, oil and natural gas by advocating for carbon capture and storage. Far from being an ecological statement of principles, the Manifesto merely rehashes the naïve belief that technology will save us and that human ingenuity can never fail. One fears, too, that the ecomodernists support geoengineering.

5. The Manifesto has a narrow, inaccurate, and whitewashed view of both “modernity” and “development.” The Manifesto’s assertions rest on the belief that industrialized modernity has been an undivided blessing. Those who support degrowth have a more complex view of history since the 18th century. The “progress” of modernity has come at a heavy cost, and is more of a mixed blessing. The ecomodernists do not acknowledge that growth in greenhouse gas emissions parallels the development of industry. The core assumption is that “development” has only one true definition, and that is to “modernize” along the lines of the already industrialized countries. The hugely destructive development path of European and Neo-European societies is the measuring stick of Progress.

6. Ecomodernism is condescending toward pre-industrial, agrarian, non-industrialized societies, and the Global South. The issue of condescension is particularly stark in the Manifesto. There is not a word about religion, spirituality, or indigenous ecological practices, even though the authors throw a bone to the “cultural preferences” for development. Pre-industrial and indigenous peoples are seen as backwards and undeveloped. The authors go so far as to say that humans need to be “liberated” from agricultural labor, as though the production of food, and small-scale farming, were not inherent goods. There is no adoration for simple living, the small scale, or bottom up approaches to development.

7. The Manifesto suffers from factual errors and misleading statements. The Manifesto is particularly greenwashed when it comes to global deforestation rates. It suggests that there is currently a “net reforestation” occurring at the international scale, which contradicts the 2014 Millennium Development Report that shows that afforestation and reforestation have, in fact, slowed deforestation rates, but that the world still suffered a net loss of forested land between 2000 and 2010 by many millions of hectares. Research by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Wide Fund for Nature confirms the reality of net forest losses. Further, the Manifesto makes dubious claims about net reductions in “servitude” over the past few centuries, and the role played by pre-historical native peoples in driving the megafauna to extinction.

In sum, the ecomodernists provide neither a very inspiring blueprint for future development strategies nor much in the way of solutions to our environmental and energy woes.

### \*AT: Growth Solves Warming

#### \*No decoupling — data that accounts for offshoring and rebound effects prove energy efficiency is getting worse. Staying below 1.5° is biophysically impossible under growth.

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Unfortunately for the ecomodernists, degrowth scholars and ecological economists have begun to poke holes in their optimistic assessments. Their response can be summarized according to three key counter-arguments: (1) the evidence that ecomodernists provide for relative decoupling is flawed and limited at best; (2) their evidence for the possibility of absolute decoupling is even weaker; and (3) even if absolute decoupling was possible in principle, there is even weaker evidence that this could occur with the necessary speed to stabilize the earth system before reaching irreversible tipping points.

First, claims that rich countries have seen relative or even absolute decoupling of economic growth from domestic material consumption have been shown to focus solely on correlations between national GDP and material throughput while ignoring the material-energetic costs embodied in imported consumer goods. For example, Thomas Wiedmann and colleagues show that while the EU, the US, and Japan have grown economically while stabilizing or even reducing domestic material consumption, a broader analysis of their material footprint embedded in their imports shows that it has kept pace with GDP growth. They conclude that ‘no decoupling has taken place over the past two decades for this group of developed countries’ (Wiedmann et al., 2015, p. 6273). Focusing on the global economy as a whole, Krausmann et al. show that its resource intensity improved over the course of the 20th century, though the early 21st century has seen a faster rate of growing resource consumption than global economic growth (cited in Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Thus, as Kallis and Hickel (Kallis and Hickel, 2019, p. 4; italics added) explain: ‘Global historical trends show relative decoupling but no evidence of absolute decoupling, and twenty-first century trends show not greater efficiency but rather worse efficiency, with re-coupling occurring’.

Second, given the limited evidence for even relative decoupling, it is little surprise that the evidential basis on which claims for the possibility of absolute decoupling rest is even flimsier. In the most comprehensive summary of the modeling evidence to date, Hickel and Kallis (2019) show that even the most optimistic scenarios fail to prove the possibility of absolute decoupling. For example, a modeling study by Schandl et al. (2016) shows that in a ‘high efficiency’ scenario, one that combines a high and rising carbon price plus a doubling in the rate of material efficiency improvement, global resource use grows more slowly (about a quarter the rate of GDP growth) but steadily to reach 95 billion tons in 2050, while global energy use grows from 14,253 million tons of oil equivalent in 2010 to 26, 932 million in 2050. The authors therefore conclude: ‘While some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in ... materials footprint’ (Schandl et al., 2016, p. 8). A high efficiency scenario modeled by the UNEP comes to even less optimistic conclusions (with global resource use rising to 132 billion tons in 2050), since it incorporates the ‘rebound effect’ in which efficiency improvements lead to increased consumption due to resulting price reductions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). In short, as they conclude, these ‘models suggest that absolute decoupling is not feasible on a global scale in the context of continued economic growth’ (Hickel and Kallis, 2019, p. 6).

Third, the critics show that even if absolute decoupling (from both emissions and total environmental impact) were possible in principle, this would need to occur fast enough to prevent transgression of ecological tipping points. Just focusing on the climate problem, the 2018 IPCC report claims that emissions must be reduced 7 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2050 in order to achieve the 1.5 C target, whereas they must reduce 4 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2075 for a shot at the 2 degree target (IPCC, 2018, p. 15). However, even under optimistic assumptions (e.g. a near-term implementation of a high and rising carbon price, alongside heroic carbon intensity improvements), studies suggest that annual declines of 3–4 per cent might be the fastest rate possible assuming continued economic growth (Hickel, 2019). Thus, it would most likely be impossible to meet the 1.5 C target in a context of continuous compound growth. While the 2 degree target might be feasible in this context (assuming implementation of a globally coordinated program starting in 2020), many argue that the IPCC’s estimates downplay the existence of positive feedbacks in the earth system (e.g. Steffen et al., 2018), and thus more rapid emissions cuts might be needed even for 2 degrees. On top of this, economic growth must also be decoupled from impacts on other ‘planetary boundaries’ that may have already been overshot, especially land-use change and biodiversity loss (Raworth, 2017). A number of ecologists believe that to bring humanity back into a ‘safe operating space’, total resource consumption should be reduced from roughly 70 to 50 gigatons per year (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014), while a ‘half earth strategy’ should be implemented that protects 50 per cent of the planet’s surface from direct human interference (up from roughly 18 per cent today) (Wilson, 2017), possibly by 2050 to prevent tipping points in biodiversity loss and land-use change (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Even if these claims are exaggerated, the magnitude of the overall decoupling challenge remains clear. It would mean that total resource consumption and land use needs to shrink, remain stable, or only increase moderately (depending on our assumptions regarding the further stress (if any) that planetary boundaries can handle) even as the total output of the global economy triples by 2060. It is thus not hyperbole to say, as Boris Frankel puts it, that this goal of absolute decoupling is ‘overwhelmingly staggering in its ambition and historical novelty’ (Frankel, 2018, p. 127).

#### \*Tech fails — doesn’t displace fossil fuels and increased consumption offsets efficiency gains.

Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, *European Environmental Bureau*, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged.

Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it.

First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.”

Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

#### Renewables only solve 18% of growth-based emissions.

Alexander, 15—lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne (Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy* pg 109-110, dml)

There is one point deserving of further emphasis. In response to the problems of climate change and peak oil, many people naturally hold up renewable energy as the salvation of civilisation, arguing that all we need to do is transition to renewable energy and the problems of peak oil and climate change will be resolved. The problem is that it is highly doubtful that renewable energy will ever be able to sustain a growth-orientated, industrial civilisation. Although it may be technically feasible from an engineering perspective, the problems of intermittency and storage make renewable energy supply much more expensive and problematic than most analysts think (see Moriarty and Honnery, 2012; Trainer, 2013a; Trainer, 2013b). Even if electricity could be affordably supplied by renewables, electricity only constitutes about 18% of final energy consumption (IEA, 2012), meaning that there is still around 82% of energy to replace, including oil used for transport, pesticides, and plastics, etc. If we try to produce that remaining segment of energy with biofuels, the production of biofuels would compete with land for food production, a conflict that also seems to be already underway, despite the relatively low levels of biofuels production today (Timilsina, 2014). Biofuels also have a very low energy return on investment – between 1 and 3 (Murphy, 2014: 12), suggesting that they will never be able to sustain an industrial civilisation, as we know it today.

#### The economy will grow 28x larger by 2100 — avoiding catastrophic warming would require GHG reductions 9x larger than even the most optimistic green growth authors think is possible.

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The figures are confronting, to say the least. Let’s assume, as with the Ward et al (2016) scenario, that continuous economic growth at a modest 2.41% growth rate leads today’s developed nations (i.e. OECD) to expand their economies eight-fold by 2100. Let us also assume that by this time the world population will have reached 11 billion, in line with median U.N projections (UNDSEA, 2017). Let us finally assume that this population has by the end of the century, caught up to the per capita incomes of the OECD. If this scenario were ever to be achieved, the global economy would end up approximately 28 times larger than it is today!

Needless to say, ecosystems are already trembling under the pressure of one ‘developed world’ at the existing size. Who, then, could seriously think our planet could withstand the equivalent of a 28-fold increase in the size of the global economy? The very suggestion is absurd, and yet this very absurdity defines the vision of the global development agenda. It is the elephant in the room. If we remember that humanity is already in ecological overshoot by 70 per cent, then to achieve long-term sustainability humanity would need to achieve a factor 48 reduction in overall environmental impact (i.e. resource use, carbon emissions) per unit of GDP. Compare this 48-factor reduction with the 5-factor reductions that some techno-optimists think might be achievable via an efficiency revolution which has historically failed to fulfil its promise (Von Weizsacker, 2009; Lovins, 1998). Accordingly, even if these figures are overstated by an order of magnitude, the point would remain that efficiency gains could not possibly be expected to make the projected amount of GDP growth sustainable. The levels of decoupling required would simply be too much (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011; Trainer, 2012). To think otherwise is not being optimistic but delusional.

### Transition

### AT: Cap Good---Space Colonization

#### 1---Private sector won’t invest, and governments won’t fund colonization.

Konrad Szocik 19. University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. 01/2019. “Should and Could Humans Go to Mars? Yes, but Not Now and Not in the near Future.” Futures, vol. 105, pp. 54–66.

6. Public opinion Public opinion is, at least in the near future, the main sponsor of space research and space exploration. Bertrand, Pirtle, and Tomblin, (2017) show that the public is interested in human mission to Mars. The most preferred space mission is a crew in orbit and a robot mission on Mars surface. In other words, public criteria is low risk and low cost. The German space agency follows public opinion and social interest because is focused on duty for society and oriented to social purposes as “climate change, mobility, communication and security” (Zypries, 2017). Politicians are prone to reduce space budgets or to not invest in long-term human settlement missions due to public opinion. Consequently, progress in space technology is still retarded. State of art in space transport means did not change qualitatively since the Space Race between the US and the Soviet Union. Impact of public opinion may differ in various countries. Max Grimard (2012), p. 6) shows how important is space program for public opinion in the US. Public sympathy for American presence in space is counterbalanced by the unpredictability of politician authorities, the tensions between presidents and the Congress (Grimard, 2012, p. 12), and the important role played by competition with Russia and China (Grimard, 2012, p. 6). Grimard adds that Russia is similar case but it is currently entire focused on stability of space programs, including renovation of old infrastructure than on new space exploration programs. According to Grimard (2012), p. 13), this fact excludes Russia from being the leader of international collaboration in space policy despite its historical advantages. China, according to Grimard, repeats space policies of the US and Soviet Union. By contrast, in Japan and Europe, prestige does not play role. Japan and Europe are focused on scientific and technological contexts. Space program is not a part of national policy. Due to its costs, politicians may decide to not risk negative approach of public opinion. But public opinion does not threaten private investors which can consider space as object of their investment. 7. Commercial exploration of space is not a workable alternative Risk of funding the wall might be avoided by commercial exploration of space (Crawford, 2016). According to Crawford, some space projects such as next generation of large telescopes or crewed mission to Mars are non-profitable. While they are a governmental duty, they could be funded partially by profits from commercial exploration of space (for instance, space mining). Hope for private exploration sounds reasonable but is counterbalanced by commercial focus on profits. Because mission to Mars has only scientific profits, only public sponsors will be invested in this project. James S. J. Schwartz (2014) adds that two of the possible reasons for human space mission, such as improving human welfare and progress in scientific exploration, are well beyond interests of private companies. Newman and Williamson (2018) quite similarly expect that private space exploration will be focused on financial profits more than on environmental sustainability. Private investors are not obliged to act altruistically and to sacrifice their business for uncertain idea. W. Henry Lambright (2017) adds that private companies at least at first stages of Mars space program will not be able to fund it. For this reason, Mars space program requires multi-generational effort and political stabilization. The challenge of safety works against private investors in space program. Public space agencies have achieved high standards of safety. They behave in careful and conservative ways. Commercial, private projects do not have the same advanced technology, the large number of scientists and support staff, and the generous budgets. Catastrophe would likely break a private space program. The lack of experience of private companies in space exploration is partially responsible for higher risk of technological failures even in relatively easy tasks as crash of Momo-2 rocket launched by Japanese start-up on 30 June 2018 several seconds after launch. This does not mean that private investors are not able to explore space, but they are able to do that only when they receive profits. In scenario of commercial exploration of space, we should wait for some point in the future when a human space base appears as byproduct of commercial activity. A human base on Mars might be a by-product of hotels on LEO or space mining. Some investors who want to build space hotels may try to settle space regions beyond LEO and build hotels on the Moon and/or Mars. From touristic point of view, staying in the Moon or Mars hotel may be more attractive than on LEO. Investors working in asteroid mining may extend their business to the Moon and/or Mars. Both enterprises even if focused on purely commercial purposes, will not be easy (perhaps impossible) to achieve by private companies alone. Elvis (2012), p. 549) argues that asteroid mining will be challenging due to, among others, difficulties in detection of appropriate asteroids. He shows that among about 1200 analyzed meteorites only 13 of them contain high level of platinum profitable for their exploitation. Elvis suggests that NASA should reorient its strategy from focus on exploration to support for commercial utilization of space. Exploration will appear as a consequence of commercial profitable activity (Elvis, 2012, p. 549). Estimated profits of asteroid mining10 are counterbalanced by high costs of exploitation and possible decreasing of price of currently rare resources (Genta, 2014).11

#### \*2---Any colony would be dependent on earth for resources---human society is too complex to survive without support.

Adam Morton 18. Visiting Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. 10/15/2018. “Three: Problems with Colonies” Should We Colonize Other Planets?, John Wiley & Sons.

Worries about refuges To be refuges where humans can survive catastrophe on Earth, colonies on other planets must of course contain and sustain humans. That is the point. They must also be highly technological: surviving in an environment less hospitable than anywhere on Earth would need powerful resources. Mars does not have an atmosphere that we can breathe, does not support plants that we can eat, is very cold, has little usable water, and receives much less solar energy. It is hard to make an analogy with anywhere on Earth: combine the light levels of the deep ocean with the cold of the Antarctic, add radiation, and then exaggerate. (The pictures from the Martian Rovers are accurate as far as colour and illumination go, but we tend to project familiarity onto them, taking the atmosphere to be like air on Earth and reading the absence of snow and ice as warmth rather than the frozen desert that it really is. I know this is my own tendency until I catch myself.) The colony must from early on produce all its own food, water, and oxygen. This is not at all impossible, given sophisticated equipment, which has been tried out under desert and arctic conditions on Earth. But these conditions are not really that much like Mars, especially with respect to cold, dark, and radiation. The equipment must continue to function, indefinitely. So it must be possible to repair it without using supplies brought from Earth. So, until local manufacturing can take over, repair equipment and spare parts must be added to the list of things that must be sent with the colonists in the first place. And, easy to overlook, it adds to the number of people who must be sent. A modern technological society of a kind that can create and repair the kind of equipment we are talking about involves thousands of specialized skills. Some combinations of these can be compressed into a smaller number of people, but many are still needed. Robinson Crusoe would not last long on Mars. Questions about the number of people in a colony are crucial. Selfsufficiency requires a large number of people – say several hundred at the least. And long-term survival requires genetic diversity. If population sizes are too small, then inbreeding makes hereditary defects and infectious diseases more common. Moreover, with a small population size, random fluctuations can result in imbalanced numbers of males and females, leading to both a smaller number in the following generation and yet more reduced diversity. (A shortage of females is obviously more serious. A bias towards females would have obvious advantages. Perhaps in fact an ideal colony should be all female plus a genetically diverse sperm bank.) It has been estimated that in wild quadrupeds a population size of 500 to 1,000 is needed for long-term survival of a species, while the crews for the simulated Mars habitats on Earth have typically had six people! Humans already have a very low genetic diversity: pairs of chimpanzees in the same troops have on average more genetic diversity than pairs of humans on Earth. The crews would have to be carefully chosen. A very special psychological makeup is needed. Crew members must endure close quarters with a small number of others, a very basic life, the knowledge that one has left one's family and friends behind, and a high risk of death. They must also be chosen so that there is a range of technical knowledge, improvisational skills, and the emotional and cultural makeup needed for something like Earth civilization to continue. And this must reproduce itself for generations. It is unlikely that, even if an optimum mix of people were achieved in the initial crew, the same mix would be preserved in subsequent generations. This too argues for larger population sizes. But the more people there are, the greater the expense and resources needed to establish the colony in the first place. A disturbing fact about the production of food on Mars has recently emerged. The soil on Mars is rich in compounds called perchlorates. They react with ultraviolet light, to which the Martian atmosphere is largely transparent, in a way that is fatal to many cells. There is thus a lot of doubt whether plant crops, and the symbiotic bacteria that many of them need, can survive in Martian soil. This complicates ambitions for indoor farming considerably. Because of the effects on both living cells and human health, perchlorate contamination is regarded as pollution on Earth. Perchlorates also have a risk of explosion when they are heated, complicating plans to produce oxygen by heating the Martian soil. They are, however, a source of oxygen and of other basic chemicals; although dangerous they could have their uses. There are surely high-tech solutions to this problem, but equally surely they raise the stakes for transport and technology and increase the danger. The complexity of technological society There is a fundamental fact behind many of these problems: the large scale and interdependence of our society, with its complex web of manufacturing techniques and expertise held in the minds of many people. It is extremely hard to duplicate this in a small population with restricted resources, especially in a hostile and unfamiliar environment. So dependence on the mother culture is hard to avoid. (This was true in the past, also. The early European colonies in North America did not make their own muskets until they had grown quite large, and European agricultural styles took a lot of adapting. This may not seem advanced technology. But could you make a musket? For that matter, could you make a stone axe?) This means that the high-tech devices needed to survive in the Martian environment are not going to be designed there. The designs are going to come from home. And it is likely that at least a proportion of the devices themselves will also. 3D printing from transmitted designs may solve some problems, though, if the raw materials can be obtained and refined on Mars. (I would imagine that supplies of direct and indirect biological material, such as the petroleum and oil products that are used to make plastics, might pose a serious problem.) If imported equipment is unsuitable or does not work because of some unexpected quirk of the faraway environment, much of it will have to be redesigned and manufactured not where it is needed but where the techniques and expertise are to be found. The more advanced the apparatus (the higher the tech), the more will need to be transported to the colony, adding to the transport costs and creating a need for spares. For all these reasons I am extremely sceptical that a colony of the size that we could send to Mars in the next decades, perhaps in the next century, could sustain itself without frequent supplies and reinforcements from Earth. The obvious reply to this is to drop the requirement that the colony be able to survive without the supplies and reinforcements. But this would undercut one of the main purposes – that of providing a remnant of humanity on Mars with a reasonable chance of surviving an earthly catastrophe. The colony would then be a scientific expedition and the beginning of a preparatory project that might take centuries.

#### \*3---Scientifically impossible.

Sukant Khurana 18. Khurana runs an academic research lab and several tech companies. 6-2-2018. "The prospect of escaping earth due to depletion of resources." Medium. https://medium.com/@sukantkhurana/the-prospect-of-escaping-earth-due-to-depletion-of-resources-e5bc92d477f0

Atmosphere Creating a breathable atmosphere is one of the first conditions of building a space settlement. Most of the planets such as Mars (95.2% CO2 and only 0.13% O2 ) [3] possesses a hostile atmosphere for human habitation. Also, the atmospheric pressure is way lower than Earth (At mean radius, Mars has an average atmospheric pressure of 0.058 psi-0.126 psi [3] where on Earth, the mean pressure at sea level is 14.6959 psi ) in most of them. The other concern related to the atmosphere is the freezing cold temperatures in our prospective colonies. Most of them do not have a proper atmosphere to contain the solar energy and some are simply far from the sun. The Martian temperature can reach anything between -60 to -65 degree Celsius [4] and this figure simply go down as we move further from the Sun. Health concerns Another big issue for us can be the difference in gravity in our prospective home. Mars for an example has a surface gravity of 3.69 m/s2 [3], only 37.9 % of Earth’s surface gravity. Such low gravity can have serious effects on the colonists. It may cause osteoporosis and cardiovascular diseases and can even lead to significant decrease of grey matter volume in our brain [5]. Radiation is another threat for a budding colony outside Earth. Planets or moons which do not have a magnetic shield like Earth, can expose the colonists to harmful radiations. Such exposers can lead to serious cognitive disabilities and may affect the fertility of the colonists. Other serious consequences include cardiovascular damages and cancer. For a Mars Mission, the standard risk of exposure induced death in astronauts can jump from 3% to 10% while the chance of morbidity becomes as high as 20% [6]. Severe psychological issues may also develop among the colonist thanks to the isolation they may experience in the early days of the colony. An interesting read in this regard is the article on the mental preparation for mars by Sadie E. Dingfelder. Economical Feasibility To set up a space colony we require a huge initial investment to cover the expenses to set up such a facility millions of miles away. Given the costs of a traditional launch and the amount of payload we need to transfer, it is almost impossible for a government to fund such an attempt without breaking the bank. A hope in this regard can be the recent developments of low-cost crafts such as the SpaceX Falcon 9 but they are still far from what is required to sustain such an ambitious effort. Conclusion From what we have discussed so far, it is clear that even if space colonization can be a solution for the survival of humankind, we are still far away from making it possible due to several factors. Hopefully, with the brilliant minds working in this sector, the day is not far when we will be harness to harness such technologies that will make our voyage towards our new home safer and cheaper. Till then, all we can do it is to try our best to protect and manage our resources so that the future generations can have a better place to live in.

### AT: Inequality

#### \*Global inequality is increasing---structural adjustment policies and net outflows have reversed progress and stagnated growth.

Hickel et al. 18, Jason Hickel: Anthropologist, author, and fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He serves on the Labour Party Task Force on International Development and works as Policy Director for The Rules collective. Nima Shirazi: Editor at Muftah, a digital foreign affairs magazine, and co-host of the media criticism podcast, Citations Needed. Adam Johnson: Host, The Appeal podcast. Media analyst at FAIR.org and host of the Citations Needed podcast (November 28th, “Episode 58: The Neoliberal Optimism Industry,” *Citations Needed*, https://citationsneeded.medium.com/episode-58-the-neoliberal-optimism-industry-and-development-shaming-the-global-south-cf399e88510e, Accessed 09-25-2021)

Nima: Can you dig a little deeper into, based on your work Jason, how the terms “development” and “growth” are really, not only misunderstood, but often deliberately misrepresented both in a political context and also throughout the media, like who do these misperceptions benefit?

Jason Hickel: So I think that there’s a narrative out there that poor countries are basically effectively catching up to rich countries, right? Because we know that, there’s China and they’re becoming a powerful player in the world stage and so on. And we’re seeing people lift out of poverty in China and India also, you know, a booming tech industry and whatnot. So clearly, you know, the gap between the rich and the poor on the global stage is shrinking. This is the dominant narrative we have. And unfortunately it’s simply not true. There are, in fact, was a period when that gap was shrinking, in the immediate postcolonial decades in the 1960s and the 1970s when newly independent governments were rolling out progressive economic reforms using Keynesian policy, protecting their economies with tariffs, using subsidies to promote infant industry developments, etcetera, etcetera. But, you know, and using land reform and labor laws to improve wages and so on. But these policies turned out to be a threat to Global North investors. Which, during the colonial years had enjoyed really easy access to cheap labor and raw materials and so on in those countries. And that was being cut off. And so they responded during the 1980s and 1990s by rolling back those progressive policies through structural adjustments imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, right? Which basically forced Global South countries to privatize public assets, to get rid of tariff barriers and subsidies, to cut spending on education and healthcare. Like all of the crucial elements necessary for real developments were basically denied to Global South countries. The vast majority of them at least. So that’s not true of East Asia and in China, and as a consequence, that region of the world did remarkably well, but what we see in the rest of the world is that the per capita income gap between the Global North and the Global South has tripled since 1960 in real terms and shows no sign of slowing down. I mean, there’s basically been, on per capita level, virtually stagnation in the Global South since the 1980s. And that’s, you know, that’s really not part of our narrative and that’s something that is a structural consequence of the way that the economy was organized during those decades.

Nima: Yeah. I think that actually leads into something that I’ve been so fascinated about while reading your work, which is that the conception that wealthy countries, countries that have historically colonized most of the world are now in a position to give back, right? To, to help out through aid or debt relief or whatever poorer countries in the Global South. So can you tell us how that view of things, that colonialism is a thing of the past that there’s no more extraction or exploitation, but now rather resources are flowing North to South from rich to poor, can you tell us how that might not exactly be true?

Jason Hickel: The dominant narrative development is that rich countries became rich kind of by their own hard work, their good institutions, their scientific inventions and so on, and poor countries are poor and remain poor because they have whatever bad governance or corruption, or maybe they’re lazy or have backwards cultural values in the more racist sense of the narrative, etcetera. But the idea is that rich countries, because they have this surplus, they’re able to sort of reach across the divide and give generously of their surplus to help poor countries up the development ladder. What I argue is that this narrative gets virtually everything about the story wrong, right? First of all, the determinants of success and failure in various countries around the world can’t be entirely attributed to only internal conditions, right? We live in a global economic system. We have done since at least the past 500 years since the onset of colonialism, and so we have to think about how the rules of that economy, of that global economic system affect the outcomes that we see around the world, right? You know, of course, that’s very easy to see during the colonial period, during the structural adjustment period in the 1980s and 1990s as well. And we can see it very clearly now in the way that capital flows around the world, right? And so if we look at total flows of money around the world right now, between the Global North and the Global South, we see something quite remarkable. This is using 2012 data, which is the last data that we have on this. But in 2012, developing countries received a total of $2 trillion US dollars in total inflows from the Global North, right? That includes aid, foreign investments, loans, remittances, everything, every bit of money, which is a lot, but in the same year, some $5 trillion flowed the other direction from South to North. So in that year there were $3 trillion in net outflows from South to North, so the South is in fact a net creditor to the North rather than the other way around. So we might be able to say that it’s, in fact, the Global South that’s developing the North rather than the North developing the South. And that really does flip the aid narrative on its head. And if we compare those outflows to aid, what we see is that for every dollar of aid that the South receives from the North, they lose $24 in net outflows, which is a tremendous reversal of the way we normally think about the situation. There’s lots of ways we can see this kind of reverse flow happening that are important to pay attention to. So one of course is the most obvious one, which is, you know, interest payments on exportable debts, which in and of itself outstrips the global aid budget, you know, almost twice over. But then we also have profit repatriation for multinational companies from host countries back to where they’re listed, which is about $500 billion per year. Sometimes even outstrips foreign direct investment flows themselves, but probably the biggest single cause of this in that outflow situation is illicit financial flows, which are largely through, you know, for the sake of tax evasion by multinational companies who are using basically tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions which are almost entirely in Global North countries controlled by Global North governments in order to secret money out of developing countries into Western bank accounts.

## Disease

### 2NC---!D---Disease

#### Resiliency, intervening actors, burnout

Adalja 16, infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh (Amesh, 6-17-2016, "Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?," *The Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/)

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

# 1NR

### Top Level

#### A ⁠— single industries, which are each a separate topic ⁠— here’s a short list

Select USA No Date, (Select USA, No Date, “INDUSTRIES”, <https://www.selectusa.gov/industries>)

The United States is home to the most innovative and productive companies in the world, forming a diverse and competitive group of industry sectors. The U.S. industries highlighted here are exceptionally dynamic and represent key opportunities for global growth and success.

Aerospace

Agribusiness

Automotive

Biopharmaceuticals

Chemicals

Consumer Goods

Energy

Environmental Technology

Financial Services

Logistics and Transportation

Machinery and Equipment

Media and Entertainment

Medical Technology

Professional Services

Retail Trade

Software and IT Services

Textiles

Travel, Tourism, and Hospitality

#### B ⁠— 32 million companies

FedCommunities 21, (FedCommunities, 9-9-2021, “Small-business owners: Share your experiences with credit access this past year,” FedCommunities <https://fedcommunities.org/data/2021-take-federal-reserve-small-businesses-credit-survey/>)

There are 32.5 million small businesses in the United States. That’s 32.5 million stories of small-business ownership. Representative data drawn from these stories can shed light on more universal experiences.

#### C ⁠— aff could further disaggregate:

#### Antitrust prohibitions can be global

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US antitrust prohibitions can apply to global conduct when there is a negative effect on competition in the United States. For instance, agreements between non-US companies, or transactions driven outside of the US, that include US compensation data, wage or benefit sharing, and/or no-hire / no poach or wage fixing agreements which impact US workforces will be in violation of this new guidance and constitute unlawful antitrust agreements. Multinational employers should therefore be mindful of sharing data or entering into such restrictive agreements where they involve US workforces.

#### AND specific products

Markham 11, Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law, The University of San Francisco School of Law (Jesse W. Markham Jr., 2011, “LESSONS FOR COMPETITION LAW FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES TO THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL,” PHENOMENON” , FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW, Vol. 16, Issue 2, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1281&context=jcfl>)

A merger is not the only setting in which antitrust champions scale efficiencies. At the retail level, economies of scale constitute a legitimate reason for a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition by imposing vertical restraints.92 Antitrust law also generally tolerates combinations of competitors into joint ventures to achieve economies of scale, with the presence of such efficiencies removing a challenge from the application of per se condemnation and establishing a facially plausible justification for the concerted activity.93 Removing conduct from per se illegality comes close to legalizing it, given the rarity of plaintiff successes in challenging the conduct under the rule of reason.94 [begin footnote 94] 94. One rare successful challenge under the rule of reason is found in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a case that is indicative of the difficulties plaintiffs face under Post-Chicago School antitrust rules. In that case the FTC challenged an agreement between competing record companies to suspend advertising and discounting of two record albums temporarily during the launch period for a jointly-produced recording. The court affirmed the FTC’s application of the rule of reason to the challenged agreement, even though it involved competitors agreeing not to put specific products on sale for a period of time – a collusive restriction on price and advertising that in an earlier era probably would have met with per se condemnation. [end footnote 94]

### AT: W/M ⁠— 2NC

#### 3 ⁠— violates “practices” ⁠— it must be a repeated, customary, and the usual mode of something

Ohio Court of Appeals 59, (YOUNGER, judge, 1959, Opinion in City of Defiance v. Nagel, 108 Ohio App. 119 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, Google Scholar Caselaw)

As used here, the noun, "practice," means an actual performance habitually engaged in; often, repeated, or customary action; usage; habit; custom; or the usual mode or method of doing something. Therefore, in this instance, the practice of doing something cannot be proved by the proof of or the admission of one single act. Criminal statutes and ordinances are to be strictly construed.

### AT: C/I ⁠— 2NC

### Framing

### AT: Group Overlimiting and Aff ground

#### A ⁠— changing the consumer welfare standard

Steinbaum 18 (inserted), the research director and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute; and Maurice E. Stucke, co-founder of the law firm, the KonkurrenzGroup, and a law professor at the University of Tennessee (Marshall Steinbaum, September 2018, “A NEW STANDARD FOR ANTITRUST: THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD: IN PRACTICE,” Roosevelt Institute, <https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Effective-Competition-Standard-brief-201809.pdf>)

Today’s economy has a market power problem. Consumers are paying higher prices; new entrants face tougher barriers; workers have little power to demand competitive wages and benefits and less mobility to leave for a better offer; and suppliers often can’t reach the market without paying powerful intermediaries for the privilege. The available economic data all point to declining competition, increasing concentration, less innovation, and widening wealth and income inequality. There are many drivers of our market power problem. One significant factor is weak antitrust law and enforcement. Over the past 35 years, Americans have paid the price for a “consumer welfare” standard, which the courts created and interpreted in ways that neither benefit consumers nor their welfare. After nearly four decades, no consensus exists on what the consumer welfare standard actually means. While it is intended to prevent monopolies from charging higher prices, it has failed even on this measure, as the empirical evidence reveals. Moreover, the consumer welfare standard ignores vast segments of the economy, including the adverse effects of mergers, powerful buyers, and unilateral restraints on upstream suppliers and workers. With such price-centric tools, the U.S. competition agencies often cannot assess how mergers and restraints will impact what is increasingly important in the 21st century economy, namely quality, privacy, and innovation. Exacerbating the shortcomings of this “consumer welfare” standard is the courts’ unwieldy, case-by-case rule-of-reason analysis, which is too costly and time-consuming for anyone other than a well-financed plaintiff to undertake. The inability to bring and win antitrust cases, in turn, allows market power to fester and accumulate unchallenged, and exploitative and predatory business models that were once illegal have since become legal. Under the current antitrust regime, our market power problem will likely worsen. Nor will the Supreme Court likely reorient antitrust to its original purpose. Thus, a new standard is needed to restore competition. We propose the effective competition standard as an alternative that would revive the original aims of antitrust law—to preserve competitive market structures. Under the effective competition standard: “Agencies and courts shall use the preservation of competitive market structures that protect individuals, purchasers, consumers, and producers; preserve opportunities for competitors; promote individual autonomy and well-being; and disperse private power as the principal objective of the federal antitrust laws.” In practice, the new effective competition standard restores the proper focus on market structures; expands the stakeholders that should be taken into account when assessing anticompetitive harms to include all those who are, in fact, harmed by anticompetitive conduct; appropriately recognizes that competition needs competitors; and returns antitrust law to its proper role in dispersing private power. There are a number of ways to implement this new standard. First, we recommend that Congress codify the above principles, in order to assure that courts construe the antitrust laws in ways that protect the interests of the majority, rather than the interests of powerful firms, and circumscribe courts from arbitrarily reaching standards or results that contribute to the market power problem. In addition, we recommend a series of specific changes to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. As a result, courts would rely far less on the Supreme Court’s rule-of-reason framework and far more on simpler legal presumptions and rules that lawyers can easily explain to their clients—and that impose greater accountability on the courts and agencies. This includes creating stronger presumptions in merger review to prevent dominant firms from acquiring rivals and mergers in concentrated markets, as well as tougher positions on monopolies and monopsonies. No longer can the Supreme Court, under its consumer welfare standard, condone monopolies charging high prices as “an important element of the free-market system,” especially when this is inconsistent with our social, moral, and political values and contrary to the economic evidence. The effective competition standard will reorient courts and enforcers to look more often upstream, protecting the right of market access and casting a skeptical eye on vertical restraints. To that end, we propose the following specific legislative changes:

ESTABLISH A NEW, CLEARER SET OF INDICES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A FIRM HAS MARKET POWER

Current law requires plaintiffs or enforcement agencies to prove that there is high concentration in a narrowly defined market prior to showing anticompetitive behavior or demonstrating that a proposed merger would cause harm. In Ohio v. American Express, the Supreme Court required the plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s market power by showing concentration, which is circumstantial evidence of market power at best, when direct evidence of market power was available. Now private plaintiffs and enforcement agencies in cases involving vertical restraints will have to define a relevant market, often a costly, timeconsuming endeavor, using antitrust’s price-centric tools, and then calculate the defendant’s market share in that market, then show that the market share is high enough to infer the defendant’s market power, even when plaintiffs have strong evidence of the restraint’s anticompetitive effects. This circumvents legal standards and economics. Rather than one sole criterion for market power—a high market share in an antitrust market—antitrust law should allow plaintiffs to offer direct and circumstantial evidence of market power, including observable direct indicia of market power on which anticompetitive claims may be premised. As many scholars have argued, high market shares are dispositive neither in favor of nor against market power, and therefore a broader range of indicia are necessary. Indeed, as the economic evidence reflects, firms with low market shares nonetheless can at times exercise significant market power upstream against suppliers and workers. These indicia should include:

• The unilateral ability to set prices or wages, or to charge prices in excess of the competitive level;

• The ability to price or wage discriminate;

• The ability to impose disadvantageous non-price contractual terms on counterparties or revise contractual terms in one’s own favor;

• The ability to exclude competitors; and

• Profits or payouts to shareholders in excess of a firm’s cost of capital for an extended period of time.

UPDATE MONOPOLIZATION/MONOPSONIZATION POLICY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE, UNILATERAL CONDUCT BY A FIRM UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Under the Supreme Court’s current consumer welfare standard, monopolies have little to fear, as the Court has significantly limited their potential liability for their anticompetitive actions. Predatory pricing cases have all but disappeared. Courts now opine that monopolies have no duty to deal. And for all of these anticompetitive actions, courts must entertain “efficiency” defenses—as though any illegal act might be rectified by some larger benefit to society, a standard that exists in no other area of law. In this landscape, it is unsurprising that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has brought only one monopolization case since 1999. (In contrast, the DOJ, between 1970 and 1972, brought 39 civil and 3 criminal cases against monopolies and oligopolies.)

We recommend the following new test for determining when a firm engages in illegal anticompetitive conduct unilaterally under the effective competition standard. Namely, the plaintiff must show that:

• First, the defendant has, and exercises, significant market power, in accordance with one of more of the indicia outlined above;

• Second, this power excludes some potential competition and/or limits or has limited some actual competition; and

• Third, this power is not attributable solely to a defendant’s ability, economies of scale, research, or natural advantages.

Next, as part of streamlining enforcement against unilateral conduct, the effective competition standard entails establishing certain actions as presumptive violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, including:

• Otherwise unlawful conduct that helps a firm attain or maintain monopoly or monopsony power;

• Predatory pricing below marginal cost for an extended period of time, for the purpose of excluding competitors and preserving market power, without the need for plaintiffs to prove “recoupment.”

• Simpler standards for assessing when refusals to deal and exclusive dealing are illegal, including when they violate suppliers’ right of market access.

• “Cheap exclusion,” or actions on the part of a dominant firm that cost little, that are intended to exclude, disadvantage, or discriminate against competitors within its market, and that do not improve efficiency.

To make clear that a range of harms are to be considered when a firm engages in price discrimination, we additionally recommend amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act to prohibit price discrimination where it hurts consumers overall, as is the concern when a firm tracks individuals’ spending patterns, collects personal data, and targets them in ways to get them to buy things they otherwise did not want, at the highest price they are willing to pay. Alternatively, Congress could consider limiting customer data collection in the first place.

MERGER POLICY UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT

Antitrust laws generally are intended to prevent harmful accumulations of market power from forming in the first place. Under current merger policy, however, the burden is on enforcers to make the case that merging firms are likely to lessen competition (namely through higher prices), resulting in lax merger review and unchallenged large-scale acquisitions. Congress should adopt the following amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act to establish a tougher merger review process:

• Rather than placing the burden on the plaintiffs, the burden would shift to parties seeking to merge in ways that would either a) significantly increase concentration levels or b) be undertaken by firms that already hold significant market power—as demonstrated through the indices outlined above. The merging parties would have to prove that their proposed acquisition will not materially lessen competition, create a monopoly or monopsony, or help maintain their market power.

• Courts should be required to take all potential competitive outcomes of a merger into account, not just prices for consumers, including whether an acquisition will harm quality, choice, innovation, and privacy. That review must examine upstream effects on workers and suppliers and downstream effects on customers and others who could be harmed, and it must not assume that market power exercised upstream would result in “efficiencies” downstream or could be offset by them.

For proposed mergers that combine firms from different levels of the supply chain (i.e., manufacturer and distributor)—known as vertical mergers—Congress should prohibit such mergers when they could foster the firm’s ability and incentive to distort competition.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OR AMONG PARTIES UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Congress should update laws that govern agreements between or among parties under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, including restrictions on the behavior of two parties at different segments of a supply chain—known as vertical restraints—such as resale price maintenance, territorial and other non-price restraints, and non-compete clauses and other provisions restricting workers’ rights in labor contracts. This should include:

• Clarifying that federal antitrust law covers both inter- and intra-brand competition; that is, competition both within and between supplier-distributor networks, such as franchises;

• Specifying that price and non-price vertical restraints are illegal, including in the labor market, other than in narrow circumstances when no party to them possesses market power and the restraints are necessary to foster innovation and competition; and

• Further clarifying that attempts to engage unlawful conduct (such as collusion), in addition to the conduct itself, are prohibited.

CONCLUSION

To address today’s market power crisis, it is crucial that we restore and revitalize America’s antitrust system. While insufficient alone to deconcentrate power in the economy—we must also increase sectoral regulation, build countervailing power among a broad set of stakeholders, and establish a robust public sector capable of meeting society’s economic needs beyond the realm of profit and private advantage—the changes outlined above would substantially reverse rising concentration and establish principles by which economic power is truly democratized. With increasing concern across the political spectrum over today’s monopolies (or data-opolies), this is an opportune time. The aim is clear: Effective antitrust is vital to promote an economy that’s inclusive, to protect the privacy interests of citizens, to advance shared economic well-being, and to foster a healthy democracy. A new competition standard adds to a much-needed progressive blueprint for a robust 21st century antitrust regime.

#### That’s the core of the topic AND worth a whole season

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Judge Richard A. Posner famously described the consumer welfare standard as the “lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the antitrust laws” in 1986.1 In the decades since, the antitrust community readily embraced the “lodestar” denomination.2 The consumer welfare standard is indeed the focal point of modern antitrust analysis, guiding decisions and informing the rules and standards antitrust law imposes. But this is not the consumer welfare standard’s only function as lodestar. It is both guide and tether. It serves as the linchpin tying antitrust law to economic concepts and reasoning. Its guidance illuminates both what antitrust law is and—just as important, what it is not. The consumer welfare standard provides the basis for distinguishing between those concerns that antitrust law appropriately considers and those that it rightly omits. In doing so, the consumer welfare standard ensures a common language is spoken across antitrust matters today. Antitrust law did not always operate with a common language. For many decades following the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust lacked a unifying, consistent language. It was a cacophonous area of law, where decisions could be—and often were— premised upon vastly different reasoning from one to another, leading to numerous inconsistencies and internal tensions. This resulted in a general confusion as to how any given case would be decided. But more fundamentally, to questions regarding the very goals of antitrust law. The consumer welfare standard, with its economic underpinning, has come to represent a robust language defining antitrust discourse today. For the last several decades, courts and enforcers, economists and practitioners, and other experts have developed this language. The analysis today is far more comprehensive than it was when the courts first embraced the consumer welfare standard 40 years ago. Experts have continued to investigate and seek out theories of harm; to develop economic tools for empirically investigating conduct; and to analyze numerous other components factoring into antitrust analysis, such as potential efficiencies. Of late, the consumer welfare standard—and antitrust law more broadly—has come under renewed criticism. Criticisms come in various forms, but largely follow a similar thread, cataloguing its purported limitations: That it myopically focuses upon the short term and only upon price effects; that it omits consideration of important sociopolitical goals; that it is incapable of identifying and condemning problems endemic in the modern economy. While some of the criticisms ring true (the consumer welfare standard does not permit consideration of socio-political factors), others do not (the consumer welfare standard addresses far more than short term price effects). And many miss the mark because they overlook the history of how and why we arrived at the current understanding. Indeed, a common characteristic of the current criticism, often referred to as the Neo-Brandeisian movement, is that it bears remarkable resemblance to those populist movements that came before it. Today, antitrust critics make nearly the exact same arguments regarding the proper goals of antitrust law—any number of socio-political ends such as protecting small businesses and preventing “bigness”—that similar movements throughout the 20th century (and the late 19th century) espoused.3 Antitrust law did, in fact, embrace a more socio-political approach, which explicitly purported to serve just such values, for much of the 20th century.

#### B ⁠— changing the burden of proof, the rule of reason, which applies across the economy — per se changes that

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The key substantive provisions of the Sherman Act are Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. An agreement can be any “meeting of the minds” between separate entities. An agreement can be express or in the form of a tacit unwritten understanding.5 Most agreements are evaluated under the “rule of reason” standard. The rule of reason is a fact-based test that requires a plaintiff to prove that an agreement has harmed competition. To prove that an agreement has harmed competition, courts typically apply a three-step burden shifting framework. The plaintiff has the initial burden to show that the agreement imposed a meaningful restriction on competition in a relevant market. Agreements among parties that do not possess some degree of market power are unlikely to generate competitive harm, so market power plays an important role in step one of the test, either directly or indirectly. If the plaintiff shows competitive harm, the defendant must show a procompetitive rationale for the agreement. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the same benefits could reasonably be achieved in a less restrictive manner.6 Where courts have determined that a particular type of agreement is unlikely to ever generate procompetitive benefits, that agreement is subject to the per se rather than rule of reason standard.7 If an agreement is per se unlawful, competitive harm is presumed and irrebuttable. Even parties that do not possess market power can violate Section 1 under the per se standard.8 Agreements in the per se category are primarily limited to agreements among competitors to fix prices, allocate territories, or engage in bid rigging. The DOJ has the discretion to prosecute these kinds of “hard core” violations criminally.9

### AT: Arbitrary

#### It’s the most common usage

Your Dictionary No Date, (YourDictionary, No Date, “Private-sector,” YourDictionary, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/private-sector>)

Private-sector meaning

The part of the economy that is controlled by individuals or private organizations and is not funded by the government.

noun

(business) All organizations in an economy or jurisdiction that are not controlled by government, including privately owned businesses and not-for-profit organizations.

*After spending two decades at various government agencies, he returned to the private sector and took a job as a business consultant.*

Of or pertaining to the private sector.

Adjective

#### Cites Senate Report ⁠— it’s publicly available, shapes antitrust research, and policy

#### US Code too!

US Code 96, (United States Code, 1-1-1996, “2 U.S. Code § 658 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/658#9>)

(9) Private sector

The term “private sector'” means all persons or entities in the United States, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions, but shall not include State, local, or tribal governments.

### AT: Functional Limits ⁠— 2NC

### AT Reasonability

# 2NR

#### No extinction from asteroids.

Farquhar et al. 17, \*Sebastian, former leader of the GPP, currently a Junior Research Fellow at Christ Church, University of Oxford in Computer Science, DPhil candidate. \*\*John Halstead, DPhil in Political Philosophy, Research Fellow @ the GPP, \*\*\*Owen Cotton-Barratt, DPhil in Pure Mathematics, Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism. *et al*. (“Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance”, *Global Priorities Project*, pg. 10, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf)

1.1.6 Natural processes

As we said at the start of this section, natural existential risks appear to be less serious than anthropogenic risks. The leading natural existential risks of which we are currently aware are Near Earth Objects (asteroids and comets), super-volcanoes, and Gamma Ray Bursts. These processes have been posited as causes of the five largest mass extinctions in history.48

According to the US National Academy of Sciences, as a rule of thumb, Near Earth Object (NEO) impacts with a diameter of 1.5km would likely kill 10% of the world population, and the damage ramps up to the entire population for those with a diameter of 10km.49 Due to the success of NEO tracking efforts, we can have relatively high confidence in the probability estimates of NEO strikes.50 On average, 5km NEOs are expected to strike once every 30 million years, and 10km NEOs once every 100 million years.51 We have discovered around 94% of nearby asteroids with a diameter of 1km or more and NASA believes all asteroids with a diameter of 10km or more have been detected,52 and continued detection of both asteroids and comets would give us time to prepare if a large NEO were on course to hit Earth. There is at present no known feasible way to deflect NEOs with a diameter of more than a few kilometres,53 though we might be able to develop such technology in the future.

#### 2---Any colony would be dependent on earth for resources---human society is too complex to survive without support.

Adam Morton 18. Visiting Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. 10/15/2018. “Three: Problems with Colonies” Should We Colonize Other Planets?, John Wiley & Sons.

Worries about refuges To be refuges where humans can survive catastrophe on Earth, colonies on other planets must of course contain and sustain humans. That is the point. They must also be highly technological: surviving in an environment less hospitable than anywhere on Earth would need powerful resources. Mars does not have an atmosphere that we can breathe, does not support plants that we can eat, is very cold, has little usable water, and receives much less solar energy. It is hard to make an analogy with anywhere on Earth: combine the light levels of the deep ocean with the cold of the Antarctic, add radiation, and then exaggerate. (The pictures from the Martian Rovers are accurate as far as colour and illumination go, but we tend to project familiarity onto them, taking the atmosphere to be like air on Earth and reading the absence of snow and ice as warmth rather than the frozen desert that it really is. I know this is my own tendency until I catch myself.) The colony must from early on produce all its own food, water, and oxygen. This is not at all impossible, given sophisticated equipment, which has been tried out under desert and arctic conditions on Earth. But these conditions are not really that much like Mars, especially with respect to cold, dark, and radiation. The equipment must continue to function, indefinitely. So it must be possible to repair it without using supplies brought from Earth. So, until local manufacturing can take over, repair equipment and spare parts must be added to the list of things that must be sent with the colonists in the first place. And, easy to overlook, it adds to the number of people who must be sent. A modern technological society of a kind that can create and repair the kind of equipment we are talking about involves thousands of specialized skills. Some combinations of these can be compressed into a smaller number of people, but many are still needed. Robinson Crusoe would not last long on Mars. Questions about the number of people in a colony are crucial. Selfsufficiency requires a large number of people – say several hundred at the least. And long-term survival requires genetic diversity. If population sizes are too small, then inbreeding makes hereditary defects and infectious diseases more common. Moreover, with a small population size, random fluctuations can result in imbalanced numbers of males and females, leading to both a smaller number in the following generation and yet more reduced diversity. (A shortage of females is obviously more serious. A bias towards females would have obvious advantages. Perhaps in fact an ideal colony should be all female plus a genetically diverse sperm bank.) It has been estimated that in wild quadrupeds a population size of 500 to 1,000 is needed for long-term survival of a species, while the crews for the simulated Mars habitats on Earth have typically had six people! Humans already have a very low genetic diversity: pairs of chimpanzees in the same troops have on average more genetic diversity than pairs of humans on Earth. The crews would have to be carefully chosen. A very special psychological makeup is needed. Crew members must endure close quarters with a small number of others, a very basic life, the knowledge that one has left one's family and friends behind, and a high risk of death. They must also be chosen so that there is a range of technical knowledge, improvisational skills, and the emotional and cultural makeup needed for something like Earth civilization to continue. And this must reproduce itself for generations. It is unlikely that, even if an optimum mix of people were achieved in the initial crew, the same mix would be preserved in subsequent generations. This too argues for larger population sizes. But the more people there are, the greater the expense and resources needed to establish the colony in the first place. A disturbing fact about the production of food on Mars has recently emerged. The soil on Mars is rich in compounds called perchlorates. They react with ultraviolet light, to which the Martian atmosphere is largely transparent, in a way that is fatal to many cells. There is thus a lot of doubt whether plant crops, and the symbiotic bacteria that many of them need, can survive in Martian soil. This complicates ambitions for indoor farming considerably. Because of the effects on both living cells and human health, perchlorate contamination is regarded as pollution on Earth. Perchlorates also have a risk of explosion when they are heated, complicating plans to produce oxygen by heating the Martian soil. They are, however, a source of oxygen and of other basic chemicals; although dangerous they could have their uses. There are surely high-tech solutions to this problem, but equally surely they raise the stakes for transport and technology and increase the danger. The complexity of technological society There is a fundamental fact behind many of these problems: the large scale and interdependence of our society, with its complex web of manufacturing techniques and expertise held in the minds of many people. It is extremely hard to duplicate this in a small population with restricted resources, especially in a hostile and unfamiliar environment. So dependence on the mother culture is hard to avoid. (This was true in the past, also. The early European colonies in North America did not make their own muskets until they had grown quite large, and European agricultural styles took a lot of adapting. This may not seem advanced technology. But could you make a musket? For that matter, could you make a stone axe?) This means that the high-tech devices needed to survive in the Martian environment are not going to be designed there. The designs are going to come from home. And it is likely that at least a proportion of the devices themselves will also. 3D printing from transmitted designs may solve some problems, though, if the raw materials can be obtained and refined on Mars. (I would imagine that supplies of direct and indirect biological material, such as the petroleum and oil products that are used to make plastics, might pose a serious problem.) If imported equipment is unsuitable or does not work because of some unexpected quirk of the faraway environment, much of it will have to be redesigned and manufactured not where it is needed but where the techniques and expertise are to be found. The more advanced the apparatus (the higher the tech), the more will need to be transported to the colony, adding to the transport costs and creating a need for spares. For all these reasons I am extremely sceptical that a colony of the size that we could send to Mars in the next decades, perhaps in the next century, could sustain itself without frequent supplies and reinforcements from Earth. The obvious reply to this is to drop the requirement that the colony be able to survive without the supplies and reinforcements. But this would undercut one of the main purposes – that of providing a remnant of humanity on Mars with a reasonable chance of surviving an earthly catastrophe. The colony would then be a scientific expedition and the beginning of a preparatory project that might take centuries.

#### \*3---Scientifically impossible.

Sukant Khurana 18. Khurana runs an academic research lab and several tech companies. 6-2-2018. "The prospect of escaping earth due to depletion of resources." Medium. https://medium.com/@sukantkhurana/the-prospect-of-escaping-earth-due-to-depletion-of-resources-e5bc92d477f0

Atmosphere Creating a breathable atmosphere is one of the first conditions of building a space settlement. Most of the planets such as Mars (95.2% CO2 and only 0.13% O2 ) [3] possesses a hostile atmosphere for human habitation. Also, the atmospheric pressure is way lower than Earth (At mean radius, Mars has an average atmospheric pressure of 0.058 psi-0.126 psi [3] where on Earth, the mean pressure at sea level is 14.6959 psi ) in most of them. The other concern related to the atmosphere is the freezing cold temperatures in our prospective colonies. Most of them do not have a proper atmosphere to contain the solar energy and some are simply far from the sun. The Martian temperature can reach anything between -60 to -65 degree Celsius [4] and this figure simply go down as we move further from the Sun. Health concerns Another big issue for us can be the difference in gravity in our prospective home. Mars for an example has a surface gravity of 3.69 m/s2 [3], only 37.9 % of Earth’s surface gravity. Such low gravity can have serious effects on the colonists. It may cause osteoporosis and cardiovascular diseases and can even lead to significant decrease of grey matter volume in our brain [5]. Radiation is another threat for a budding colony outside Earth. Planets or moons which do not have a magnetic shield like Earth, can expose the colonists to harmful radiations. Such exposers can lead to serious cognitive disabilities and may affect the fertility of the colonists. Other serious consequences include cardiovascular damages and cancer. For a Mars Mission, the standard risk of exposure induced death in astronauts can jump from 3% to 10% while the chance of morbidity becomes as high as 20% [6]. Severe psychological issues may also develop among the colonist thanks to the isolation they may experience in the early days of the colony. An interesting read in this regard is the article on the mental preparation for mars by Sadie E. Dingfelder. Economical Feasibility To set up a space colony we require a huge initial investment to cover the expenses to set up such a facility millions of miles away. Given the costs of a traditional launch and the amount of payload we need to transfer, it is almost impossible for a government to fund such an attempt without breaking the bank. A hope in this regard can be the recent developments of low-cost crafts such as the SpaceX Falcon 9 but they are still far from what is required to sustain such an ambitious effort. Conclusion From what we have discussed so far, it is clear that even if space colonization can be a solution for the survival of humankind, we are still far away from making it possible due to several factors. Hopefully, with the brilliant minds working in this sector, the day is not far when we will be harness to harness such technologies that will make our voyage towards our new home safer and cheaper. Till then, all we can do it is to try our best to protect and manage our resources so that the future generations can have a better place to live in.